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ABSTRACT
The main theme of my thesis is how uncertainty affects behaviors. I explore how
agents seek to resolve uncertainty in different environments. In Chapter 1, agents
learn from the messages of informed experts in a signaling game. In Chapter 2,
an agent learns about a fixed and uncertain physical environment through dynamic
experimentation. In the last chapter, agents learn about others’ preferences through
the outcome of a central matching mechanism.
Motivated by the question of how opposing political candidates who are policy
experts can communicate to voters in a way that helps them win the election, I
study a delegation problem with two informed, self-interested agents. Agents make
proposals before the decision maker decides to whom to delegate a task. The
innovation is that there are multiple issues that the principal and agents care about,
and the agents can be vague about any issue in their proposals. Intuition says that
agents should be specific about the issues that they are trusted on and vague about
other issues. I find the opposite: an agent is disadvantaged by revealing information
about certain issues to the decision maker, those on which he is trusted by the
principal on. The reason is that doing so enables his opponent to take advantage of
this revealed information and undercut him. Essentially, when the principal is on an
agent’s side for some issue, that agent does not want to be specific, because it creates
a visible target for his opponent to react to. He wants to be vague, because that
allows the principal’s ignorance about the optimal action create an insurmountable
obstacle for his opponent. As a result, it is to an agent’s advantage to be vague about
the issue that he is trusted on.
The second chapter investigates the implication of biased updating in dynamic
experimentation such as a firm’s R&D process. People exhibit near miss effect
during gambling. For example, if the first two wheels of a slot machine indicate
a potential final outcome of jackpot but the last wheel indicates a loss, people are
motivated to gamble more. An outcome that is close to a success but is still a
failure is called a “near miss.” In this chapter, I explain the near miss effect in
a firm’s repeated R&D process. There are two factors that sequentially affect the
profitability of R&D, both of which are uncertain. First is whether the R&D team
is skilled enough to make a technical breakthrough. If a breakthrough occurs,
then a second factor comes into play, which is whether the market demand is high
enough to make the product profitable. Moreover, good news for the first stage
vis a prerequisite for learning about the second stage. In each one of the infinite
periods, the decision maker of the firm decides whether to involve in risky R&D
and observe whether the outcome is a failure (no breakthrough), a success (with
breakthrough and high market demand), or a near miss (with breakthrough but low
market demand). I assume that the decision maker of the firm learns about the skill
of the team properly, but when she updates about the market demand, she updates
incorrectly and overweighs her prior. In particular, her posterior about the market
demand is a convex combination of her prior and the Bayesian posterior. This bias
affects the relative updating of the two factors, which gives rise to the near miss
effect: after a near miss is observed, the decision maker values doing R&D more
than before although she has received no payoff.
I show that if the decision maker is sufficiently biased and overweighs her prior
enough, then she exhibits the near miss effect. I also compare the near miss effect
for decision makers with different degrees of biases. As it turns out, the more biased
a decision maker is, the more sever she exhibits the near miss effect. However, given
the decision maker’s belief about the two factors, the more biased she is, the less
she values R&D. Consequently, the value of R&D is highest for a Bayesian.
In the last chapter, I study how well a centralized matching mechanism works when
agents do not know others’ preferences. I consider a standard two-sided marriage
matching problem, except that agents only know their own preferences. Roth (1989)
proved by an example the non-existence of a mechanism with at least one stable
equilibria. In his proof, an agent is allowed to report a preference that is realized with
ex ante zero probability, which violates the setup of a Bayesian game. Instead, by
restricting agents to report only preferences with positive realization probabilities, I
show that Roth’s result still holds. More interestingly, as long as agents are allowed
to form blocking pairs after a matching outcome is announced, the final outcome is
always stable with respect to the true preferences. This means that even when the
mechanism fails to produce a stable outcome, it can still release enough information
for agents to initialize a blocking pair, which induces a stable outcome.
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1C h a p t e r 1
VAGUENESS IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROPOSALS
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies how competition shapes information revelation. Consider two
self-interested agents, Agent 1 and Agent 2, who communicate to a decision maker
(DM) about their future actions. Agents have private information about the con-
sequences of actions and can strategically choose to be vague about their actions.
When actions are multidimensional, whether and on which dimension to be vague
are the subjects of this paper.
Delegation often involves multidimensional decisions. Consider a parent who
chooses between two schools for her child. Many aspects of a school affect a
child’s well-being: the physical activity level, the social environment and the cur-
riculum, etc. A school can reveal these information about itself, but may not credibly
convey whether it is optimal for the child. For example, a school may announce
that their students have PE classes twice a week. Without knowing the optimal
frequency of PE classes for a child, a parent cannot evaluate how well the school
does in terms of physical well-being. In this paper, I show that if both schools
know the consequence of PE class frequency, then the school that is stronger in
developing students’ physical well-being has an incentive to be vague about their PE
class frequency. The reason is, by making a specific announcement of its PE class
frequency, it reveals the optimal PE class level to the parent. The weaker school can
in turn promise an appropriate PE class level that makes it slightly better overall. In
other words, by being specific, a school’s advantage is undermined.
Here is the formal setup. Nature chooses a state of the world. Agent 1 and Agent 2
observe the state, then simultaneously announce proposals. The DM, who does not
observe the state, tries to infer the state from the proposals, and selects one agent
to implement the decision. The outcome of the decision depends on the state and
determines everyone’swelfare. Both the decision and the state aremultidimensional.
For each dimension, one agent has an advantage in that his interest is more closely
aligned to the DM’s than his opponent’s.
Agents can choose their levels of commitment as well as actions to commit to. They
are allowed to be vague about any dimension of their future action by sending a
2null message. Consequently, they have full freedom to take any action if chosen to
make the decision. However, they are bound to any specific, non-vague actions that
they propose. Since a commitment is binding, it likely reflects an agent’s private
information about the state. On the contrary, vagueness gives an agent full freedom
to implement his own ideal action without revealing their private information. As a
result, commitment and information revelation go together.
I show that vagueness is a natural consequence of competition. Not only is vagueness
sustainable in equilibrium, an agent’s vagueness appears on the dimension that he
has an advantage on. If he is vague about dimension 1, then the DM believes that
he will implement his ideal action without herself knowing what that is. Since she
is ignorant about the state, she is free to adopt any belief about it. In particular, she
is free to believe that any specific action proposed by Agent 2 is Agent 2’s own ideal
action, which is worse than Agent 1’s ideal action. Therefore, the DM’s ignorance
precludes any possible compromises by Agent 2 on his disadvantaged dimension.
On the other hand, if Agent 1 is specific about dimension 1 and reveals the state,
Agent 2 can then propose an action on dimension 1 which is less biased than his
ideal action. Since the DM learns the optimal action from Agent 1, she realizes
that Agent 2 is offering a compromise by comparing Agent 2’s ideal action given
the optimal action and Agent 2’s proposed action. Therefore information about
Agent 2’s disadvantaged dimension allows him to make credible compromises and
demonstrate that he is the better agent.
For the solution concept of this two-sender signaling game, I use a strengthening
of the weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Apart from some regularity equilibrium
conditions that simplify the analysis, the DM’s belief needs to satisfy a sensible
consistency condition. I define and characterize equilibria in Section 1.2 and 1.3.
Signaling games typically have multiple equilibria. The Intuitive Criterion (Cho and
Kreps, 1987) is a standard equilibrium refinement for one-sender signaling games.
As a side product, I develop a refinement for two-sender signaling games in the spirit
of the Intuitive Criterion. Equilibria with vagueness occurring on agents’ aligned
dimensions survive this refinement (Section 1.4).
As robustness checks, I show in the Appendix II - IV how the results extend when
I vary the state space, number of dimensions and the preference of the DM. I also
explore the case in which agents can be partially vague and commit to a strict subset
of the action space.
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θ
Agent 1’s putative equilibrium proposal
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A∗
B∗
B′
DM’s indifference curve
Figure 1.1: Only vague about misaligned dimensions
This mechanism through which competition shapes information revelation can be
used to gain insights into electoral competition. There is active research on how
parties choose which issues to campaign on as well as invest effort in if elected
(Ash, Morelli, and Van Weelden, 2015; Egorov, 2015). In the language of this
paper, campaign issue choice is a way for informed political parties to make pol-
icy commitments and I draw a connection between this choice and parties’ interest
alignment with voters. This paper is also related to ambiguity in political campaigns
(Meirowitz, 2005; Alesina and Holden, 2008; Kamada and Sugaya, 2014; Kartik,
Van Weelden, and Wolton, 2015). This literature focuses on the existence of vague-
ness when the state space is one-dimensional, whereas I study a multidimensional
state space and where vagueness occurs.
An Example
To see why it may be unwise to commit to a specific action, consider a DM choosing
an agent to make a two-dimensional decision y = (y1, y2). I refer to the vector θ − y
as the outcome, where θ ∈ R2 is the state of the world that is unknown to the DM
but known to the two agents. All players have quadratic utilities characterized by
their ideal actions given the state. Figure 1.1 illustrates players’ ideal actions for
any given state θ. The DM’s ideal action equals θ. Each agent has a constant bias.
A∗ and B∗ are Agent 1 and Agent 2’s ideal actions given θ, respectively. Note that
the horizontal distance between A∗ and θ is smaller than that between B∗ and θ,
and the vertical distance between B∗ and θ is smaller than that between A∗ and θ.
Dimension 1 is then called Agent 1’s aligned dimension and Agent 2’s misaligned
4dimension. The opposite is true for dimension 2.
Consider the putative equilibrium proposals by the agents as shown in Figure 1.1.
Agent i’s proposal has a specific commitment to his ideal action on dimension i, but
is vague about dimension j. Since he is free to implement any action for dimension
j if chosen, the rational choice is to implement his ideal action. So overall he will
choose his ideal action on each dimension. Since A∗ and B∗ are of equal distance
to θ, the DM is indifferent between agents’ ideal actions and assumed to randomize
50-50 between the agents. Lastly, notice that since each agent commits on his ideal
action on dimension i, the DM learns θi from Agent i.
However, either agent has an incentive to deviate. Suppose that Agent 2 deviates as
follows: instead of being vague about his misaligned dimension, now he is vague
about his aligned dimension. The DM is surprised by the proposal profile she
observes and her belief over Θ is unspecified. Moreover, for some beliefs, she
prefers Agent 2 while the opposite is true for other beliefs. The key to decide which
agent is better is to determine the sensible beliefs.
The key idea is that when Agent 2 deviates to make a surprising proposal, the
DM should still believe in the information content of Agent 1’s proposal. That is,
she should believe that Agent 1 has not deviated and learns θ1 from his proposal.
Given this belief, which agent is better? Agent 2 is compromising on dimension
1 by committing to a less biased action. For dimension 2, since he is vague he
implements his ideal action. So B′ is the action Agent 2 has deviated to. As in
equilibrium, Agent 1 will implement A∗. The DM then strictly prefers Agent 2.
Since in equilibrium Agent 2 gets A∗ half the time and B∗ half the time, Agent 2 has
made a profitable deviation.
Hence, revealing the state for the opponent’s misaligned dimension creates a visible
target for him to react to. Vagueness, however, allows the DM’s belief to create
an insurmountable obstacle for the opponent. Suppose instead that in equilibrium,
Agent 1 is vague about both dimensions. Then any concession by Agent 2 is
incredible, since nothing stops the DM from believing that he is proposing his own
ideal action. For convenience, here I focus on a special case in which no agents
have an overall advantage. In Section 1.3, I discuss a general-bias case while still
retaining the feature that each agent has a advantage over a dimension. I also
provide conditions for the existence of equilibria in which agents are vague about
their aligned dimensions only.
5Relation to Existing Literature
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to address competition for delegation
in a multidimensional action and state space. Ambrus, Baranovskyi, and Kolb
(2015), the first study of competition for delegation, uses a one-dimensional setup.
Battaglini (2002) studies a multidimensional setting, but communication takes the
form of cheap talk. Neither studies the role of vagueness in information disclosure.
My paper is connected to the disclosure literature (see Dranove and Jin (2010) for a
survey). Here I briefly discuss the connection of my paper with Grossman (1981).
He studies an environment in which a seller chooses whether to credibly disclose
his quality and shows that all types of sellers fully disclose. The idea is that suppose
two sellers of different qualities are pooled together. Then the buyer is only willing
to pay the price as if the quality is an average of the two. Now the higher-quality
of the two sellers can profit by disclosing his quality and receive a higher price,
since the buyer now has a higher willingness to pay. The argument is based on
the assumption that the seller could always have disclosed his exact quality. The
counterpart of exact disclosure in my model is vagueness. An agent can always be
vague and let the DM know the payoff from choosing him. The difference is that
vagueness serves an additional purpose, which is masking the state of the world.
This helps sustaining vagueness in equilibrium.
This paper is broadly related to work on competition in information revelation,
which takes two forms: verifiable information revelation and cheap talk communi-
cation. The former (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2012; Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2015)
assumes that informed parties cannot distort information; they can only decide how
much information to provide. Cheap talk communication with multiple senders is
investigated by Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Battaglini (2002). In particular,
informativeness of cheap talk in electoral campaigns is studied by Schnakenberg
(2014),Kartik, Squintani, and Tinn (2015) and Kartik and Van Weelden (2014).
Blume, O. J. Board, and Kawamura (2007) and Blume and O. Board (2014) study
vagueness in one-sender cheap talk in the form of noisy messages.
Another strand of related literature is delegation to informed, biased agents. Alonso
and Matouschek (2008) study the DM’s problem of how to optimally restrict the set
of actions that an agent can take. Li and Suen (2004) discuss when a DM should
delegate, and how biased the agent should be in order to be delegated. I focus
on the communication from agent to the DM and assume that the only choice the
DM can make is choosing between two agents. Ambrus, Baranovskyi, and Kolb
6(2015)’s question is probably closest to mine. They investigate agents’ proposals
when a coarsely informed DM lacks the ability to measure the difference between
two proposed actions. They demonstrate the existence of equilibrium in which
agents distort their private signals. Distortion comes from the fact that the agents
are imperfectly informed, while I study perfectly informed agents.
Lastly, this paper contributes to the equilibrium refinement literature. Refinement
for one-sender signaling games is well-studied (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Banks and
Sobel, 1987). Vida and Honryo (2015) study the implication of strategic stability
(Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) in general multi-sender signaling games. They find
that stability implies a condition for out-of-equilibrium beliefs which states that
the receiver rationalizes an out-of-equilibrium signal with the minimal number of
deviations (Bagwell and Ramey, 1991). Schultz (1996) applies this belief restriction
in a game where two informed parties decide how much public good to provide.
1.2 The Model
A decision affecting a decision maker (DM) and two agents needs to be made.
The DM is unable to implement actions and has to delegate it to one of the two
agents. Only the agents have the relevant information that pertains to the decision
making — they observe a state of the world that determines the consequence of any
given action. Afterwards, agents simultaneously announce proposals. The DM then
chooses an agent to implement his proposal.
The state, denoted by θ = (θ1, θ2), concerns two dimensions: θ1 is the state on
dimension 1 and θ2 on dimension 2. θ is distributed over Θ ≡ R2 according to some
continuous distribution function F with density f . f has full support on R2. The
space of proposals is M = (R ∪ {∅})2, where R is the action space and ∅ denotes
a message indicating vagueness. For i = 1, 2, mi = (m1i ,m
2
i ) denotes Agent i’s
proposal and m = (m1,m2) denotes the proposal profile.
If Agent i is chosen, he implements an action yi = (y1i , y
2
i ) ∈ R2. For each dimension
k ∈ {1, 2}, the set of feasible actions depends on mki as follows. If Agent i is specific
about dimension k and announces mki ∈ R, then he is committed to mki and must
choose yki = m
k
i . If Agent i is vague about dimension k and announces m
k
i = ∅,
then he is free to choose any action yki ∈ R.
The DM and the agents have conflicting interests. When the state is θ and the action
is y, the DM’s payoff is
ud (θ, y) = −(θ1 − y1)2 − (θ2 − y2)2.
7Agent 1 and 2’s payoffs are
u1(θ, y) = −(θ1 − y1 − b11)2 − (θ2 − y2 − b21)2,
u2(θ, y) = −(θ1 − y1 − b12)2 − (θ2 − y2 − b22)2,
where b1 = (b11, b
2
1) and b2 = (b
1
2, b
2
2) are agents’ biases. Given the state θ, the DM’s
ideal action equals to the state. Agent i’s ideal action is equal to θ − bi. Throughout
the paper I assume that |b11 |< |b12 | and |b22 |< |b21 |. Since for dimension 1 Agent 1 is
less biased than Agent 2, I call dimension 1 Agent 1’s aligned dimension and Agent
2’s misaligned dimension. The opposite is true for dimension 2. The rule of the
game, all players’ utility functions (and therefore their ideal actions given the state),
and the state distribution are common knowledge.
An agent’s proposal is sufficient for the DM to evaluate her expected payoff from
choosing him. To see this, note that if an agent is specific on a dimension, he
implements his proposed action. If he is vague on a dimension, he rationally takes
his ideal action contingent on the state observed. Since the DM knows the biases
of agents, her payoff from choosing this agent is also fixed. Therefore we can
ignore agents’ eventual action choices and focus on their proposals. A pure strategy
for Agent i is a function si : Θ → M mapping states into proposals. A strategy
for the DM is a function β : M × M → [0, 1] mapping proposal profiles into the
probabilities that Agent 1 is chosen. The DM’s posterior belief µ : M ×M → ∆(Θ)
maps each possible proposal profile m into a probability measure µ(· | m) over Θ.
I use the solution concept of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (weak PBE)
(s1, s2, β, µ) satisfying single-deviation consistency. This new consistency notion
limits how the DM updates her belief about agents’ strategies when she is surprised.
After observing a surprising move by the agents, she updates her belief under the
assumption that agents make strategic choices independently. As a result, know-
ing that one agent has deviated does not impact her belief about the other agent’s
strategy. To simplify the analysis, I focus on equilibria in which agents play pure
strategies on the equilibrium path, the DM randomizes 50−50whenever indifferent,
agents’ choices of vagueness do not depend on the state realization (the invariance
condition) and are symmetric (the symmetry condition). The invariance condition
says that if Agent i is vague (specific) about dimension k at some state θ, then he
is vague (specific) about dimension k at all states. The symmetry condition says
that if Agent i is vague about his misaligned (aligned) dimension, then Agent j is
also vague about his misaligned (aligned) dimension, which is Agent i’s aligned
(misaligned) dimension. Therefore two agents’ choices of vagueness depend on
8their comparative advantage in the same way. Note that I do not assume agents
play symmetric strategies, only that the choice of vagueness is symmetric. Agents
can vary their specific proposals differently according to the state. From now on,
a weak PBE satisfying above requirements is abbreviated as “an equilibrium.” An
equilibrium with vagueness is one in which vagueness is supported in equilibrium
on some dimension by some agent.
Before formally defining the equilibrium, I first define single-deviation consistency.
Given a weak PBE (s1, s2, β, µ), the prior F ∈ ∆(Θ) induces a probability distribu-
tion G1 ∈ ∆(M) through s1, G2 ∈ ∆(M) through s2, and G0 ∈ ∆(M × M) through
s1 and s2. Let supp(Gk ) denote the support of Gk , k = 0, 1, 2. Agent i’s proposal
mi is consistent with equilibrium if mi ∈ supp(Gi), inconsistent with equilibrium if
otherwise. A proposal profile m is on-path if m ∈ supp(G0), off-path if otherwise.
Definition 1 (Single-deviation consistency) Let (s1, s2, β, µ) be a weak PBE and
F ∈ ∆(Θ) the prior which inducesG1, G2 ∈ ∆(M) andG0 ∈ ∆(M ×M). The DM’s
belief µ satisfies single-deviation consistency if, for all m = (m1,m2) < supp(G0),
µ(m) ∈ ∆({θ ∈ Θ | s1(θ) = m1} ∪ {θ ∈ Θ | s2(θ) = m2})
when {θ ∈ Θ | s1(θ) = m1} ∪ {θ ∈ Θ | s2(θ) = m2} is nonempty. Otherwise
µ(m) ∈ ∆(Θ).
In other words, a DM faced with an off-path (m1,m2) believes that either Agent 1 or
Agent 2 has not deviated whenever believing so is possible.
To understand the definition, let’s divide the possible off-path m = (m1,m2) into the
following cases:
1. Neither m1 or m2 is consistent with equilibrium;
2. mi is consistent with equilibrium but m j is inconsistent with equilibrium;
3. Both m1 and m2 are consistent with equilibrium;
In Case 1, the DM learns that both agents have deviated. Since neither m1 nor m2 is
consistent with equilibrium, both {θ ∈ Θ | s1(θ) = m1} and {θ ∈ Θ | s2(θ) = m2}
are empty sets and µ(m) is unrestricted according to Definition 1. Since the DM’s
action following a bilateral deviation is irrelevant in sustaining the equilibrium, so
is her belief.
9In Case 2, only Agent j is inconsistent with equilibrium. The DM learns that
Agent j has deviated. But the DM has the freedom to either believe that Agent
i has also deviated or that Agent i is playing according to equilibrium. Since
{θ ∈ Θ | si (θ) = mi} is nonempty while {θ ∈ Θ | s j (θ) = m j } is empty, the DM
believes that Agent i has not deviated.
In Case 3, both agents are consistent with equilibrium. To see how this can be
possible for an off-path m, consider a putative equilibrium in which s1(θ) = s2(θ) =
θ for all θ. Now suppose that at some state θ, Agent 1 deviates to the proposal
m′1 = θ , θ. The DM then observes a proposal profile (θ, θ). This is an off-path
proposal profile because in equilibrium agents announce the same proposal. Since
m is off-path, by definition at no θ are s1(θ) = m1 and s2(θ) = m2 both satisfied.
So at least one agent has deviated. In other words, if the DM believes that Agent
1 has not deviated, then she believes that Agent 2 has deviated; if she believes that
Agent 2 has not deviated, then she believes that Agent 1 has deviated. Since both
{θ ∈ Θ | si (θ) = mi} and {θ ∈ Θ | s j (θ) = m j } are nonempty, she can indeed
believe that Agent 1 has not deviated (and so Agent 2 has deviated), or that Agent
2 has not deviated (and so Agent 1 has deviated). Since she cannot decide who the
deviator is, her belief allows both cases.
To summarize, for all possible off-path proposal profiles that the DM may face
following a unilateral deviation of an agent, the DM identifies the deviator according
to single-deviation consistency. It is important to identify the deviator and non-
deviator because the DM can rely on the information contained in the non-deviator’s
proposal and his equilibrium strategy to infer the state.
The notion of single-deviation consistency applies to general signaling games. Its
intuition is as follows. If the DM believes that agents make independent strategic
choices, then whether an agent has deviated should depend on that agent’s proposal
only and not his opponent’s. Suppose that Agent i is inconsistent with equilibrium
while Agent j is consistent with equilibrium. The DM learns that Agent i has
deviated, but she should not use this fact as an excuse to change her belief about
Agent j’s strategy. She should continue to believe that Agent j is playing his
equilibrium strategy s j . The single-deviation consistency shuts down the channel
in which one agent’s deviation impacts the DM’s belief about the other agent. On
the other hand, suppose that both agents are consistent with equilibrium. The
single-deviation consistency implies that the DM imposes minimal departure from
rationality to rationalize deviations and believes that only one agent is the deviator
10
whenever possible.
The notion that agents’ strategic choices are independent is not new. Battigalli (1996)
defines the independence property for conditional systems over the strategy profiles.
An implication of independence is that the marginal conditional probabilities about
player i’s strategies are independent of information which exclusively concerns
player j’s strategies. It is shown that the independence property of conditional
systems is necessary for an equivalent assessment to satisfy the consistency notion
of sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
Watson (2015) first formally defines perfect Bayesian equilibrium for infinite games
without nature moves. The definition retains sequential rationality and puts forward
a new notion for consistency, called “plain consistency.” Under this framework,
the DM’s belief has two components: her belief over the strategies of agents and
over the state. Since the latter is determined by the former and the proposal profile
observed, we can focus on the belief over strategies. According to plain consistency,
the DM assigns probability 1 to Agents playing their equilibrium strategies. When
she reaches an off-path m = (m1,m2) where m2 is inconsistent with equilibrium and
m1 is consistent with equilibrium, she only alters her belief about Agent 2’s strategy.
Her belief about Agent 1 should remain as before and so concentrate on Agent 1’s
equilibrium strategy.
Now we have all the ingredients for the equilibrium definition:
Definition 2 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium (s1, s2, β, µ) is a weak PBE in which
1. si : Θ→ M , i = 1, 2;
2. β : M × M → {0, 12, 1};
3. µ satisfies single-deviation consistency;
4. (Invariance) For i ∈ {1, 2} and k ∈ {1, 2},
a) if ski (θ) = ∅ for some θ, then s
k
i (θ) = ∅ for all θ;
b) if ski (θ) , ∅ for some θ, then s
k
i (θ) , ∅ for all θ.
5. (Symmetry) ∀θ,
a) if s1(θ) = (∅,∅), then s2(θ) = (∅,∅);
b) if s1(θ) = (∅,w) for some w ∈ R, then s2(θ) = (z,∅) for some z ∈ R;
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c) if s1(θ) = (w,∅) for some w ∈ R, then s2(θ) = (∅, z) for some z ∈ R;
Just to clarify, 4 and 5 are conditions on agents’ equilibrium strategies, not the set
of proposals that agents can deviate to. In particular, at any state, an agent is free
to deviate to a proposal that is vague about any dimension regardless of his bias
and the state realization. I investigate the consequence of dropping the symmetry
condition in a smaller state space in Appendix II.
1.3 Main Results
What should agents be vague about? Common wisdom may suggest that agents
should focus on the dimension that they have advantages on and ignore others. As
a result, an agent should commit on their aligned dimension and be vague about
their misaligned dimension. The model suggests otherwise. If Agent 1 is vague
about dimension 1, then being vague is beneficial since the DM already trusts him
on this dimension. More importantly, for any commitment made by Agent 2, the
DM is free to believe that Agent 2 is committing on his own ideal action since
she has arrived at an off-path information set. On the other hand, if Agent 1 is
specific about dimension 1 and reveals θ1 to the DM, Agent 2 can anchor on this
revealed information and deviates by offering a compromise. The DM believes that
only Agent 2 has deviated and continues to trust the information about θ1 revealed
by Agent 1. This way Agent 2 is able to credibly compromise on his misaligned
dimension.
The results characterize equilibria in terms of where vagueness occurs in agents’
proposals and construct an equilibrium. I first consider the case in which agents
have zero biases on their aligned dimensions.
Proposition 1 Suppose that b11 = b22 = 0. In all equilibria with vagueness, vague-
ness occurs on agents’ aligned dimensions. An equilibrium in which vagueness only
occurs on agents’ aligned dimensions exists.
All proofs are relegated to Appendix I. Here I demonstrate the intuition behind the
proof. By Definition 2, in any equilibrium with vagueness, the agents’ proposal
profile must take one of the following forms:
1. s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (∅,∅), ∀θ.
2. s1(θ) ∈ {∅} × R, s2(θ) ∈ R × {∅}, ∀θ.
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3. s1(θ) ∈ R × {∅}, s2(θ) ∈ {∅} × R, ∀θ.
In both 1 and 2, vagueness occurs on agents’ aligned dimensions. In 3, vagueness
only occurs on agents’ misaligned dimensions. I show that 3 cannot be an equilib-
rium proposal profile. Suppose first that both agents commit to their ideal actions
on their aligned dimensions. The DM then learns θi from Agent i, i = 1, 2. Now
suppose that some Agent i deviates to compromise on his misaligned dimension, i.e.
propose an action preferred by the DM to his ideal action. By single-deviation con-
sistency, the DM continues to believe the information revealed by m j and therefore
realizes that Agent i is making a compromise. This deviation is profitable as long as
the compromise is small enough. The rest of the argument establishes that agents
commit to their ideal actions on their aligned dimensions given that they have zero
bias.
Although agents cannot be vague only about their misaligned dimensions, they can
be vague only about their aligned dimensions. Consider the following putative
equilibrium proposals for the agents: s∗1(θ) = (∅, θ
2 − b21), s∗2(θ) = (θ1 − b12,∅) for
all θ. In this equilibrium, each agent reveals the state for his misaligned dimension
and implements his ideal action on each dimension. Consider a potential deviation
by Agent i to make compromises on dimension i and propose an action strictly better
for the DM than his ideal action. This deviation leads to an on-path proposal profile
and the DM chooses his equilibrium action. Since Agent i deviates to a worse action
but retains his equilibrium probability of winning, the deviation is unprofitable. The
rest of the argument shows that even if an agent deviates to a compromise which
is inconsistent with equilibrium (so that the DM realizes that he has deviated), the
DM is free to believe that his action is his own ideal action and will not change his
probability of winning.
Proposition 1 characterizes equilibria with vagueness and establishes its existence
when agents have zero biases on their aligned dimensions. The next proposition does
so under a more general bias structure and illustrates that the undercutting intuition
still applies. With arbitrary bias, it is hard to demonstrate that the equilibrium
proposals must be fully revealing regarding the dimension that it is specific about.
However, starting with a fully-revealing equilibrium such as one in the following, it
is easy to see that such strategies cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose that |b11 |< |b12 | and |b22 |< |b21 |. Then both agents commit-
ting to their ideal actions on the aligned dimensions and being vague about their
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misaligned dimensions cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Both agents being vague
about both dimensions can be sustained in equilibrium.
Consider a putative equilibrium proposal profile in which both agents are vague
about all dimensions in all states: s∗1(θ) = s
∗
2(θ) = (∅,∅), ∀θ. Suppose at some θ,
Agent 1 deviates to be specific about any given dimension(s). The deviation leads
to an off-path proposal profile, at which point the DM should maintain the belief
that Agent 2 has not deviated but is free to choose any beliefs regarding Agent 1’s
strategy. One of the beliefs that can deter this deviation and therefore support (s∗1,
s∗2) as part of an equilibrium is the belief that Agent 1 has deviated to his own ideal
action. Under this belief, the DMmaintains his equilibrium action. Since Agent 1’s
deviation action cannot be strictly preferred to his own ideal action and he gets the
same probability of winning as in equilibrium, such a deviation is unprofitable.
1.4 Refinement: Extended Intuitive Criterion
In the last section, I showed that there exist equilibria in which agents are vague
about their aligned dimensions. But this should not come as a surprise. In signaling
games, there typically exist multiple equilibria supported by unreasonable beliefs. In
this section, I show that the beliefs supporting the equilibria I identified are actually
very reasonable in the sense that they satisfy a refinement similar to the Intuitive
Criterion, adapted for two-sender games. The refinement combines the Intuitive
Criterion for one-sender games with single-deviation consistency. For an off-path
proposal profile, single-deviation consistency identifies the deviator. The Intuitive
Criterion restricts what types of deviations the DM is allowed to believe in.
One-sender: Intuitive Criterion
The Intuitive Criterion for one-sender signaling games places restrictions on the
receiver’s beliefs after an unexpectedmessage by the sender. The receiver is required
to believe that the sender’s private information is such that the highest payoff that
the sender can get by deviating to the observed message is weakly higher than the
sender’s equilibrium payoff, given that the receiver does not react to the message
with dominated actions.
First I review the idea of Intuitive Criterion. For consistency, I will keep using the
terminologies and notations from Section 2.2 to describe both one-sender and two-
sender signaling games and the equilibrium refinements. In a one-sender signaling
game, given the state θ, the Agent’s proposal m ∈ M , the DM’s action β ∈ B, the
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Agent’s utility is denoted by ua (θ,m, β) and the DM’s utility ud (θ,m, β). The DM’s
belief over Θ given m is denoted by µ(· | m). Given m and µ, the set of the DM’s
best responses is:
B˜R (µ,m) = argmax
β∈B
∫
Θ
ud (θ,m, β) dµ(θ | m).
For any nonempty T ⊂ Θ and m ∈ M ,
BR (T,m) =
⋃
µ:µ(T |m)=1
B˜R (µ,m)
denotes the set of the DM’s best responses according to beliefs supported on T .
When T is empty, let BR (T,m) = BR (Θ,m).
Given an equilibrium (s∗, β∗, µ∗), the Agent’s equilibrium payoff at θ is denoted by
u∗a (θ). For an off-path proposal m′, the set of states at which the Agent’s highest
payoff from deviating to m′ given that the DM best responds to some belief is higher
than the Agent’s equilibrium payoff is
Θ(m′) = {θ | max
β∈BR (Θ,m′)
ua (θ,m′, β) ≥ u∗a (θ)}.
Finally, an equilibrium (s∗, β∗, µ∗) fails the Intuitive Criterion if there exists θ ∈ Θ
and off-path m′ ∈ M such that
u∗a (θ) < min
β∈BR (Θ(m′),m′)
ua (θ,m′, β).
When the DM observes an unexpected proposal m′, the support of her belief is
restricted to be states at which m′ is potentially profitable. That is, the highest payoff
that the Agent can get given that the DM does not play dominated actions is weakly
higher than his equilibrium payoff. The Agent then contemplates deviations given
that the DM best responds to beliefs thus restricted. If for some θ and off-path
proposal m′, any such best response makes the Agent strictly better off compared to
in equilibrium when the state is θ, then the equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion.
Two-sender: Extended Intuitive Criterion
I extend the Intuitive Criterion to the two-sender case by combining single-deviation
consistency with the Intuitive Criterion. Single-deviation consistency identifies the
deviator. The Intuitive Criterion identifies the kind of deviations that the receiver is
allowed to believe in.
In a two-sender signaling game, given the state θ ∈ Θ, agents’ proposal profile
m = (m1,m2), and the DM’s action β ∈ B, Agent i’s utility is denoted by ui (θ,m, β)
and the DM’s utility ud (θ,m, β) where m = (m1,m2). Let µ(· | m) denote the DM’s
belief over Θ conditional on m. Given an equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2, β
∗, µ∗), Agent i’s
15
equilibrium payoff at θ is denoted by u∗i (θ). Similar as before, G0 is the distribution
over M × M induced by the equilibrium strategies (s∗1, s∗2) and the state distribution
F over Θ. Gi (i = 1, 2) is the distribution over M induced by s∗i and F. I now
introduce the equilibrium refinement.
Definition 3 (The Extended Intuitive Criterion) Let (s∗1, s∗2, β∗, µ∗) be a weak
PBE of a two-sender signaling game. For each m = (m1,m2) < supp(G0) and
i ∈ 1, 2, form the set
Θi (m) =
{
θ | s∗j (θ) = m j, u∗i (θ) ≤ max
β∈BR (Θ,m)
ui (θ, s j (θ),mi, β)
}
.
(s∗1, s
∗
2, β
∗, µ∗) fails the Extended Intuitive Criterion if there exists θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, 2},
m′i ∈ M such that
u∗i (θ) < min
β∈BR (Θ1(m′)∪Θ2(m′),m′)
ui (θ,m′, β),
where m′ = (m′i, s j (θ)). An equilibrium satisfying the Extended Intuitive Criterion
is called an intuitive equilibrium.
Whenever the DM faces an off-path proposal profile m′, her belief is restricted
to be supported on Θ1(m′) ∪ Θ2(m′). Θi (m′) is the set of states at which only
Agent i is the deviator and his deviation is potentially profitable. In calculating the
payoff from deviating, apart from assuming that the DM does not play dominated
actions, the Agent also assumes that the other Agent plays according to equilibrium.
Note that Θi (m) may be empty because m j < supp(G j ) or mi is not potentially
profitable. However, as long as m results from a unilateral deviation and the
deviation is potentially profitable, Θ1(m) ∪ Θ2(m) is nonempty. An equilibrium
fails the Extended Intuitive Criterion if at some state θ, some Agent i can profitably
deviate to some m′i as long as the DM best responds to restricted beliefs upon
observing (m′i, s j (θ)).
Robustness of Equilibria
Previously I have identified some equilibria in which agents are vague about their
aligned dimensions. When |b11 |< |b12 | and |b22 |< |b21 |,
s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (∅,∅),∀θ
can be sustained in equilibrium. As a special case, when b11 = b
2
2 = 0
s1(θ) = (∅, θ2 − b21), s2(θ) = (θ1 − b12,∅),∀θ
can also be sustained in equilibrium. As it turns out, both of them are robust to the
Extended Intuitive Criterion refinement.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that |b11 |< |b12 | and |b22 |< |b12 |. Intuitive equilibria in which
both agents are vague about their aligned dimensions exist. Furthermore if b11 =
b22 = 0, in all intuitive equilibria with vagueness, vagueness occurs on agents’
aligned dimensions.
The equilibrium in which both agents are vague about both dimensions is supported
by the following belief: whenever one of the agents deviates, he is committing
to his own ideal action for the dimensions he is specific about. To show that
this belief satisfies single-deviation consistency, I first show that for some β ∈
{0, 12, 1}, committing to own ideal action gives the deviator higher payoff compared
to equilibrium. Then I show that there is some belief µ ∈ ∆(Θ) according to which
β is a best response, and hence β is not dominated.
Furthermore when b11 = b
2
2 = 0, I show that the putative equilibria in which both
agents are only vague about their misaligned dimensions do not satisfy the Extended
Intuitive Criterion. In fact, if we require the DM’s belief to satisfy single-deviation
consistency, then any agent has a profitable deviation. For this deviation, all the
beliefs satisfying single-deviation consistency in fact concentrate on the event that
the deviator has made a potentially profitable deviation. Essentially, the Extended
IntuitiveCriterion does not put further restriction on beliefs apart from those imposed
by single-deviation consistency. So the equilibria in which agents are only vague
about their misaligned dimensions are not intuitive equilibria. This establishes
that all the intuitive equilibria with vagueness has vagueness occurring on agents’
aligned dimensions.
1.5 Discussion
One may be interested in knowing how allowing agents’ vagueness impacts the
DM’s payoff. To illustrate this, consider a game which is identical to the setup
so far except that agents are not allowed to be vague. That is, M = R2. There
are two consequences of such a restriction. First, it is hard to sustain a simple
fully-revealing equilibrium. For example, consider a putative equilibrium in which
s1(θ) = s2(θ) = θ, for all θ. This is in fact not a weak PBE because at any θ ∈ R2,
there is θ˜ ∈ R2 such that exactly one of the two following events happens: either θ˜
is a profitable deviation for Agent 1 at θ, or θ is a profitable deviation for Agent 2
at θ˜. The key reason is, whenever an agent deviates, the DM cannot tell who the
deviator is. Therefore she must take the same action after seeing Agent 1 proposes
θ˜ and Agent 2 proposes θ. If her action is favorable towards Agent 1, then Agent 1
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has an incentive to deviate; otherwise Agent 2 has an incentive to deviate.
Second, the DM can potentially get worse-off due to not allowing agents’ vagueness.
To see this, consider the following equilibrium: s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (θ
1
, θ
2
) for
all θ. The reason that both agents making the same constant proposal can be
sustained in equilibrium is that, whenever an agent deviates to an alternative action
on either dimension, the DM is free to believe that the optimal action is closer to
the equilibrium action than the deviator’s action. In this equilibrium, the DM gets
a payoff that depends on the distance from the state realization and the equilibrium
proposal.
Consider a pooling equilibrium in thewith-vagueness setup: s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (∅,∅)
for all θ. This equilibrium is very similar to the constant equilibrium above since it
is also supported by the belief that any deviation is no better than equilibrium for the
DM. However in this equilibrium, the DM gets the less-biased agent’s ideal action.
If his bias is sufficiently small, then the all-vague equilibrium is better for the DM.
This is the case because when agents are always vague, undercutting is essentially
ruled out. Therefore agents can secure their ideal actions without worrying that
their opponent will offer a more favorable action to the DM. The undercutting leads
to an equilibrium in which both agents offer the optimal action, which turns out
to be non-equilibrium as shown above. Vagueness protects agents from making
concessions that lead to non-existence of equilibrium.
Appendix I.
Throughout the proof, I use udevi (θ,m
dev
i ,m j ) to denote Agent i’s payoff after deviat-
ing to mdevi at state θ, at which Agent j’s equilibrium proposal is m j . pii denotes the
DM’s expected payoff from choosing Agent i given her beliefs and agents’ proposals.
Given Agent i’s proposal mi, yi (mi) denotes Agent i’s policy. u∗i (θ) denotes Agent
i’s equilibrium payoff at state θ.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the agents’ strategies s1, s2 are as follows:
s1(θ) = (w(θ),∅),
s2(θ) = (∅, z(θ)),
where w, z : Θ→ R. Then β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 for all θ.
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Proof. Suppose that β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0 for some θ. Then Agent 1 has a profitable
deviation s2(θ). To see this, first note that Agent 1’s equilibrium payoff at θ is
u∗1(θ) = u1(θ, y2(∅, z(θ))) = u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1 − b12, z(θ))).
Now let Agent 1 deviate to s2(θ). Given m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) = ((∅, z(θ)), (∅, z(θ)))
and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 > pi2. This is because |b11 |< |b12 | and both agents propose the
same action on dimension 2. Therefore β(m) = 1 and Agent 1’s deviation payoff is
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) = u1(θ, y1(∅, z(θ))) = u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1 − b11, z(θ))) > u∗1(θ).
Similarly, if β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1 for some θ, then Agent 2 has a profitable deviation
s1(θ). To summarize, agents win with equal probability in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1
The first part of the proof rules out agents’ strategies s1, s2 as follows:
s1(θ) = (w(θ),∅),
s2(θ) = (∅, z(θ)),
where w, z : Θ → R. I prove this by contradiction by first characterizing w and z
and then demonstrating incentives to deviate. Without loss of generality, I assume
that b1 = (0, b21) and b2 = (b
1
2, 0) where ‖b1‖≤ ‖b2‖.
Step 1. β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 for all θ.
This follows from Lemma 1.
Step 2. w(θ) = θ1, z(θ) = θ2, ∀θ.
Suppose that w(θ) , θ1 for some θ. Then Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅,∅).
To see this, first note that
u∗1(θ) =
1
2
u1(θ, y1(w(θ),∅)) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z(θ))) <
1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z(θ))).
Now let Agent 1 deviate to mdev1 = (∅,∅). Given m = (m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) =
((∅,∅), (∅, z(θ))) and µ ∈ ∆(Θ),
pi1 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, θ − b1)µdθ = −‖b1‖2,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ1 − b12, z(θ))µdθ ≤
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ1 − b12, θ2)µdθ = −‖b2‖2≤ pi1.
Therefore β(m) ≥ 12 . Moreover, because for any θ and z(θ),
u1(θ, y1(∅,∅)) > u1(θ, y2(∅, z(θ))),
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we have
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) ≥
1
2
u1(θ, y1(∅,∅)) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z(θ)))
=
1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z(θ)))
> u∗1(θ).
(∅,∅) is then a profitable deviation for Agent 1. Therefore w(θ) = θ1 for all θ
and pi1 = −‖b1‖2. Since β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 for all θ, pi2 = pi1 = −‖b1‖2. This
immediately rules out ‖b1‖< ‖b2‖ since
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ1 − b12, z))µdθ ≤
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ1 − b12, θ2))µdθ = −‖b2‖2< −‖b1‖2.
Therefore s1, s2 can only be sustained in equilibrium when ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖. In this
case, I use the same argument as above to show z(θ) = θ2 for all θ.
We have finished characterizing w and z. Given that w(θ) = θ1, z(θ) = θ2, for all θ,
u∗1(θ) =
1
2
u1(θ, θ − b1) + 12u1(θ, θ − b2) = −
1
2
‖b1 − b2‖2.
Step 3. At any θ, Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅, θ2− (1−  )b21), where  > 0
is small.
Suppose that Agent 1 deviates to said proposal at θ. The DM observes m =
(mdev1 , s2(θ)) = ((∅, θ
2 − (1 −  )b21), (∅, θ
2
)) and believes that only Agent 1 has
deviated. Therefore µ(m) ∈ ∆(T (m)), where
T (m) = {θ | s2(θ) = (∅, θ2)} = {θ | θ2 = θ2}.
For any µ ∈ ∆(T (m)),
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, θ − b2)µdθ = −‖b2‖2= −‖b1‖2,
pi1 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ1, θ
2 − (1 −  )b21))µd(θ)
=
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ1, θ2 − 1 +  ))µdθ = −‖(1 −  )b1‖2> pi2.
Therefore β(m) = 1 and for  small enough.
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s1(θ)) = u1(θ, (θ
1
, θ
2 − (1 −  )b21)) = ‖(0, b21)‖2= −2(b21)2 > u∗1(θ),
making (∅, θ2 − (1 −  )b21) a profitable deviation.
The second part of the proof establishes
s1(θ) = (∅, θ2 − b21),
s2(θ) = (θ1 − b12,∅),
as an equilibrium. The DM’s belief and strategy are as follows:
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1. For any m = ((∅,w), (z,∅)) where w, z ∈ R, µ(z + b12,w + b21) = 1.
β(m) =

1
2 if ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖,
0 if ‖b1‖> ‖b2‖,
1 if ‖b1‖< ‖b2‖.
2. For any m = ((∅,∅), (z,∅)) where z ∈ R, µ{θ˜ | θ˜1 = z + b12} = 1 and β(m)
is same as 1.
3. For any m = ((w,∅), (z,∅)) where w, z ∈ R, µ{θ˜ | θ˜1 = z + b12} = 1.
β(m) =

1
2 if ‖(z + b12 − w, b21)‖= ‖b2‖,
0 if ‖(z + b12 − w, b21)‖> ‖b2‖,
1 if ‖(z + b12 − w, b21)‖< ‖b2‖.
4. For any m = ((q,w), (z,∅)) where q, w, z ∈ R, µ{θ˜ | θ˜1 = z + b12, θ˜2 =
w + b21} = 1.
β(m) =

1
2 if ‖(z + b12 − q, b21)‖= ‖b2‖,
0 if ‖(z + b12 − q, b21)‖> ‖b2‖,
1 if ‖(z + b12 − q, b21)‖< ‖b2‖.
5. For any m = ((∅,w), (∅,∅)) where w ∈ R, µ{θ˜ | θ˜2 = w + b21} = 1 and β(m)
is same as 1.
6. For any m = ((∅,w), (∅, z)) where w, z ∈ R, µ{θ˜ | θ˜2 = w + b21} = 1.
β(m) =

1
2 if ‖b1‖= ‖(b12,w + b21 − z)‖,
0 if ‖b1‖> ‖(b12,w + b21 − z)‖,
1 if ‖b1‖< ‖(b12,w + b21 − z)‖.
7. For any m = ((∅,w), (q, z)) where w, q, z ∈ R, µ(q + b12,w + b21) = 1.
β(m) =

1
2 if ‖b1‖= ‖(b12,w + b21 − z)‖,
0 if ‖b1‖> ‖(b12,w + b21 − z)‖,
1 if ‖b1‖< ‖(b12,w + b21 − z)‖.
8. For any other m, µ ∈ ∆(Θ) and β(m) ∈ B˜R (µ,m).
µ(· | m) satisfies single-deviation consistency for all m. For m as the result of a
unilateral deviation by Agent i such that mi < supp(Gi), the DM believes that Agent
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j has not deviated. m for which mi ∈ supp(Gi) for i = 1, 2 while m < supp(G0)
does not exist in this equilibrium since Θ = R2.
No agent has an incentive to deviate. Suppose ‖b1‖> ‖b2‖. In equilibrium Agent
2 wins with his ideal action, so he has no incentive to deviate. For Agent 1, the
possible deviations are as follows:
(a) If Agent 1 deviates to (∅,w) where w , θ2 − b21, the DM does not detect
the deviation and continues to randomize 50-50. Therefore his probability of
winning remains unchanged and he gets a worse outcome than his winning
outcome in equilibrium when he wins.
(b) If Agent 1 deviates to (∅,∅), his probability of winning remains unchanged
and he gets the same winning outcome as that in equilibrium.
(c) If Agent 1 deviates to (q,∅) where q ∈ R. Since
pi1 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (q, θ2 − b21))µdθ ≤
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ − b1))µdθ = −‖b1‖2< pi2,
he still loses.
(d) Suppose that Agent 1 deviates to (q,w) where q, w ∈ R. The DM correctly
believes that Agent 2 is proposing his ideal action and that θ1 = z + b12. Also
she believes that Agent 1 is proposing his own ideal action for dimension 2.
Therefore, for any z ∈ R, pi1 < pi2 and β(m) = 0. So (q,w) is unprofitable.
None of the deviations render a higher-than-equilibrium payoff for Agent 1. Reverse
the role of Agent 1 and Agent 2 in the cases above and we get the case in which
‖b1‖< ‖b2‖ . When ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖, in equilibrium agents win with equal probability.
The only change from the argument above is:
(c) If Agent 1 deviates to (q,∅), then pi1 ≤ −‖b1‖2= pi2, so Agent 1’s probability
of winning is lower compared with equilibrium.
(d) For any z ∈ R, pi1 ≤ pi2, with equality reached when z = θ1. So Agent 1’s
probability of winning is lower compared with equilibrium.
Since in equilibrium, Agent 1 wins with probability 12 and gets his ideal action
conditional on winning, neither (q,∅) nor (q,w) is profitable. We have exhausted
the different cases for biases and shown that the above strategies constitute an
equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the proposal profile
s1(θ) = (θ1 − b11,∅),
s2(θ) = (∅, θ2 − b22)
for all θ. The first part of the proof shows that for arbitrary biases b1, b2 such that
|b11 |< |b12 | and |b22 |< |b21 |, s1, s2 as above cannot be sustained in equilibrium. I
show the proof in two cases: ‖b1‖< ‖b2‖ and ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖. The ‖b1‖> ‖b2‖ case is
symmetric to ‖b1‖< ‖b2‖.
First note that from Lemma 1, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 for all θ. Therefore for all θ,
u∗1(θ) =
1
2
u1(θ, θ − b1) + 12u1(θ, θ − b2) = −
1
2
‖b1 − b2‖2.
Case 1. ‖b1‖< ‖b2‖.
Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅,∅) at any state θ. Given m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) =
((∅,∅), (∅, θ
2 − b22)), µ{θ˜ | θ˜2 = s2(θ) + b22} = 1. Then
pi1 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, θ − b1)µdθ = −‖b1‖2,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, θ − b2)µdθ = −‖b2‖2< −‖b1‖2.
Therefore β(m) = 1 and
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) = u1(θ, θ − b1) = 0 > u∗1(θ).
Case 2. ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖.
Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅, θ2 − (1 −  )b21) for small  > 0. Given
m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) = ((∅, θ
2 − (1 −  )b21), (∅, θ
2 − b22)), µ{θ˜ | θ˜2 = s2(θ) + b22} = 1.
Then
pi1 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, (θ1 − b11, θ2 − (1 −  )b21))µdθ = −‖(b11, (1 −  )b21)‖2,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, θ − b2)µdθ = −‖b2‖2= −‖b1‖2< −‖(b11, (1 −  )b21)‖2.
Therefore β(m) = 1 and for  > 0 small enough,
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) = u1(θ, (θ
1 − b11, θ
2 − (1 −  )b21)) = −2 |b21 |2> u∗1(θ).
The second part of the proof shows that the following is an equilibrium proposal
profile:
s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (∅,∅),∀θ.
The DM’s belief and strategy is as follows: for any m such that there is exactly one
agent who is specific for any dimension(s), the DM believes that he is proposing
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his own ideal action. In other words, if m is such that m j = (∅,∅) and mi ∈
(R × {∅}) ∪ ({∅} × R) ∪ (R2), µ{θ˜ | θ˜ j = m ji + b ji ,∀ j s.t. m ji ∈ R} = 1. Any other
m is the result of bilateral deviation and µ(m) is not restricted by single-deviation
consistency or consequential in sustaining the equilibrium. Therefore µ(m) ∈ ∆(Θ)
and β(m) ∈ B˜R (µ,m).
To see that no agent has an incentive to deviate, suppose that at θ Agent i deviates
to mdevi . Given m = (m
dev
i ,m j ), note that
pii =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, θ − bi)µdθ.
Therefore deviating does not change how favorable the DM perceives the deviator’s
proposal. So β(m) = β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) and mdevi is unprofitable.
Proof of Proposition 3
First I show that the equilibrium
s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (∅,∅),∀θ
satisfies the Extended Intuitive Criterion. The proof is divided into two cases:
‖b1‖> ‖b2‖ and ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖. ‖b1‖< ‖b2‖ is symmetric.
Case 1. ‖b1‖> ‖b2‖.
In equilibrium, Agent 2 wins and the outcome is b2. Therefore for any θ,
u∗1(θ) = u1(θ, θ − b2) = −‖b1 − b2‖2
u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, θ − b2) = 0.
For any m , ((∅,∅), (∅,∅)) that results from a unilateral deviation, µ(· | m) is as
follows: if m is such that m j = (∅,∅) and mi ∈ (R × {∅}) ∪ ({∅} × R) ∪ (R2),
µ{θ˜ | θ˜ j = m ji + b ji ,∀ j s.t. m ji ∈ R} = 1.
For m such that m1 = (∅,∅) and m2 ∈ (R × {∅}) ∪ ({∅} × R) ∪ (R2), µ(· | m)
assigns probability 1 to the event that Agent 2 has deviated to committing to his
ideal action.
1. If β(m) = 0, then for any θ, udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m2, β) = u2(θ, θ − b2) = 0, so the
highest payoff Agent 2 gets by deviating is no less than his equilibrium payoff.
2. β(m) = 0 is not dominated because it is the best response to µ(· | m).
For m such that m2 = (∅,∅) and m1 ∈ (R × {∅}) ∪ ({∅} × R) ∪ (R2), µ(· | m)
assigns probability 1 to the event that Agent 1 has deviated to committing to his
ideal action.
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1. If β(m) = 0, then for any θ, udev1 (θ, s2(θ),m1, β) = u1(θ, θ − b2) = u∗1(θ), so
the highest payoff Agent 1 gets by deviating is no less than his equilibrium
payoff.
2. β(m) = 0 is not dominated because it is the best response to µ(· | m).
Case 2. ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖.
In equilibrium, both agents win with probability 12 . Therefore for any θ,
u∗1(θ) =
1
2
u1(θ, θ − b1) + 12u1(θ, θ − b2) = −
1
2
‖b1 − b2‖2,
u∗2(θ) =
1
2
u2(θ, θ − b1) + 12u2(θ, θ − b2) = −
1
2
‖b1 − b2‖2.
For m such that m1 = (∅,∅) and m2 ∈ (R × {∅}) ∪ ({∅} × R) ∪ (R2), µ(· | m)
assigns probability 1 to the event that Agent 2 has deviated to committing to his
ideal action.
1. If β(m) = 12 , then for any θ, u
dev
2 (θ, s1(θ),m2, β) = u
∗
2(θ), so the highest
payoff Agent 2 gets by deviating is no less than his equilibrium payoff.
2. β(m) = 12 is not dominated because it is the best response to µ(· | m).
For m such that m2 = (∅,∅) and m1 ∈ (R × {∅}) ∪ ({∅} × R) ∪ (R2), µ(· | m)
assigns probability 1 to the event that Agent 1 has deviated to committing to his
ideal action.
1. If β(m) = 12 , then for any θ, u
dev
1 (θ, s2(θ),m1, β) = u
∗
1(θ), so the highest
payoff Agent 1 gets by deviating is no less than his equilibrium payoff.
2. β(m) = 12 is not dominated because it is the best response to µ(· | m), the
actual belief.
When ‖b11‖= ‖b22‖= 0,
s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (∅,∅),∀θ
continues to be an intuitive equilibrium.
Moreover, from Proposition 1,
s1(θ) = (w(θ),∅),
s2(θ) = (∅, z(θ)),
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where w, z : Θ→ R is not an equilibrium. To see it is not an intuitive equilibrium,
note that in Step 2, after Agent 1’s deviation (∅,∅), the DM’s belief about the
profitability of the deviation is independent of her belief about the state. This is
because for any state, such a deviation is profitable when β = 1. Moreover, β = 1
is not dominated because if the DM believes that Agent 2 has not deviated, then it is
a best response since ‖b1‖≤ ‖b2‖. And this is required by both the single-deviation
consistency and the Extended Intuitive Criterion.
In Step 3, Agent 1’s undercutting goes through because the restricted beliefs under
both single-deviation consistency and the Extended Intuitive Criterion assigns prob-
ability 1 to Agent 2 has not deviated. In addition, the Extended Intuitive Criterion
assigns probability 1 to the event that Agent 1’s deviation is potentially profitable.
Since Agent 1’s deviation is indeed profitable if β = 1 and β = 1 is a best response
to the belief that only Agent 1 has deviated, this deviation is profitable even if we
require the equilibrium to be intuitive.
To be precise, the three steps are as follows (assuming without loss of generality
‖b1‖≤ ‖b2‖):
Step 1. β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , ∀θ.
Step 2. w(θ) = θ1, z(θ) = θ2, ∀θ.
Steps 1 and 2 are identical to the those in the proof for Proposition 1.
Step 3. At any θ, Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅, θ2 − (1 −  )b21), where
 > 0 is small.
Suppose that Agent 1 deviates to said proposal at θ. The DM observes m =
(mdev1 , s2(θ)) = ((∅, θ
2 − (1 −  )b21), (∅, θ
2
)). Then
Θ1(m) = {θ˜ | s2(θ˜) = (∅, θ2), u∗1(θ˜) ≤ max
β∈BR (Θ,m)
u1(θ˜, s2(θ˜),mdev1 , β)} = {θ˜ | θ˜2 = θ
2}.
whereas Θ2(m) is empty. This is because s2 pins down θ2 and for any θ such that
θ2 = θ
2, u1(θ, s2(θ),mdev1 , 1) = u1(θ, (θ
1 − b11, θ
2 − (1 −  )b21)) = −2 |b21 |2> u∗1(θ)
for small enough  . Moreover, 1 ∈ BR (Θ1(m),m) and therefore is not dominated.
Θ2(m) is empty because mdev1 ∈ supp(G1) given s1.
For all µ ∈ ∆(Θ1(m)), pi1 > pi2. Therefore BR (Θ1(m),m) = {1} and
udev1 (θ, s2(θ),m
dev
1 ) > u
∗
1(θ), making m
dev
1 a profitable deviation.
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Appendix II. General Strategies in a Binary State Space
In order to relax the assumption that agents’ equilibrium choices of vagueness are
symmetric, I study the following setup as a special case. θ is uniformly distributed
overΘ = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. In order to allow arbitrary compromises by the
agents and ensure both agents’ ideal actions are implementable, I let action space to
be the interval [−1, 1]. Therefore the proposal space is M = ([−1, 1] ∪ {∅})2. The
agents’ biases are b1 = (0, 1) and b2 = (1, 0). The next proposition illustrates where
vagueness is likely to occur.
Proposition 4 1. An intuitive equilibrium in which each agent is vague on his
aligned dimension and commits on his misaligned dimension exists.
2. There does not exist a weak PBE in which, at some state, each agent is vague
on his misaligned dimension and commits on his aligned dimension.
For part 1, I construct a semi-revealing equilibrium in which the DM learns the state
at (1, 1), but assigns equal probabilities to the rest of the states when the state is not
(1, 1). The construction relies on the following property of any equilibrium: if both
agents propose the same action at a state, then any deviation is potentially profitable.
Even if Agent i has deviated to a less-preferred action, as long as the DM selects
Agent i with zero probability, he gets the same payoff as in equilibrium.
Part 2 first shows that specific commitments must be agents’ own ideal actions. I
then show that there is a profitable deviation for Agent 1 regardless of the off-path
beliefs of the DM. In other words, there is no need to resort to equilibrium refinement
to rule out these strategies.
Proof of Proposition 4.
(1) Consider a proposal profile
s1(θ) = (∅, q(θ)),
s2(θ) = (z(θ),∅)
in which q, z : Θ→ [−1, 1] are as follows:
q(θ) = z(θ) =

1 if θ = (1, 1),
0 otherwise.
Let β : M × M → [−1, 1] and µ : M × M → ∆(Θ) be as follows:
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- If m is on-path, β(m) = 12 .
µ((1, 1) | (∅, 1), (1,∅)) = 1;
µ((0, 0) | (∅, 0), (0,∅)) = µ((0, 1) | (∅, 0), (0,∅))
= µ((1, 0) | (∅, 0), (0,∅)) = 1
3
.
- If m is off-path and there is at least one Agent i with mi consistent with
equilibrium, µ(· | m) is defined as follows:
If m1 , (∅, 1) and m2 , (1,∅), µ((0, 0) | m) = 1; otherwise µ((1, 1) | m) =
1.
- If m = (m1,m2) where both m1 and m2 are inconsistent with equilibrium,
µ(m) is unrestricted.
To be precise, µ(· | m) and β(m) for all off-path m are defined as follows:
a) For m = (mdev1 , (0,∅)) where m
dev
1 is inconsistent with equilibrium:
µ((0, 0) | m) = 1. Ifmdev1 = (0, 0), then β(m) = 12 ; otherwise β(m) = 0.
b) For m = (mdev1 , (1,∅)) where m
dev
1 is inconsistent with equilibrium:
µ((1, 1) | m) = 1. Ifmdev1 = (1, 1), then β(m) = 12 ; otherwise β(m) = 0.
c) For m = ((∅, 0),mdev2 ) where m
dev
2 is inconsistent with equilibrium:
µ((0, 0) | m) = 1. Ifmdev2 = (0, 0), then β(m) = 12 ; otherwise β(m) = 1.
d) For m = ((∅, 1),mdev2 ) where m
dev
2 is inconsistent with equilibrium:
µ((1, 1) | m) = 1. Ifmdev2 = (1, 1), then β(m) = 12 ; otherwise β(m) = 1.
e) For m = (mdev1 ,m
dev
2 ) where both m
dev
1 and m
dev
2 are inconsistent with
equilibrium, µ(· | m) is unrestricted. β(m) ∈ B˜R (µ,m).
f) For m = ((∅, 0), (1,∅)), µ((1, 1) | m) = 1, β(m) = 0.
g) For m = ((∅, 1), (0,∅)), µ((1, 1) | m) = 1, β(m) = 1.
It is easy to verify that for all m, β(m) ∈ B˜R (µ(m),m). To see that the
equilibrium satisfies the Extended Intuitive Criterion, note that for all m in
Case (1)a, (0, 0) ∈ Θ1(m). To see this, note that
Θ1(m) = {θ | s2(θ) = (0,∅), u∗1(θ) ≤ max
β∈BR (Θ,m)
βu1(θ, y1(m1)) + (1
− β)u1(θ, y2(m2))}.
Since u∗1(0, 0) = −1 = u1((0, 0), y2(m2)), the above inequality always holds
for (0, 0), with equality reached by β = 0. Similarly, (0, 0) ∈ Θ2(m) for all m
in Case (1)c.
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For all m in Case (1)b, the DM believes that Agent 2 has not deviated and
(1,∅) pins down the state (1, 1). Moreover, if Agent 1’s deviation is potentially
profitable, then (1, 1) ∈ Θ1(m); otherwise,Θ1(m) is the empty set and µ(· | m)
is unrestricted. Therefore µ((1, 1) | m) is supported on the set of states for
which no agent hasmade a deviation that is not potentially profitable. Similarly
for all m in Case (1)d.
For m in Case (1)f, the DM believes that Agent 1 has deviated and therefore
θ = (1, 1). At (1, 1), Agent 1’s deviation (∅, 0) is potentially profitable be-
cause u1((1, 1), y1(∅, 0)) = u1((1, 1), (1, 0)) = 0 > −1 = u∗1(1, 1). Therefore
(1, 1) ∈ Θ1(m). Similarly, (1, 1) ∈ Θ2(m) for m in Case (1)g.
Now I show that Agent 1 has no incentives to deviate; Agent 2 is symmetric.
- At state (0, 0), u∗1(0, 0) = −1.
(i) If mdev1 = (∅, 1), u
dev
1 ((0, 0),m
dev
1 ,m2) = u1((0, 0), y1(∅, 1)) =
u1((0, 0), (0, 1)) = −4 < −1 = u∗1(0, 0).
(ii) If mdev1 = (0, 0), u
dev
1 ((0, 0),m
dev
1 ,m2) =
1
2u1((0, 0), y1(0, 0)) +
1
2u1((0, 0), y2(0,∅)) = −1 = u∗1(0, 0).
(iii) For any other mdev1 inconsistent with equilibrium,
udev1 ((0, 0),m
dev
1 ,m2) = u1((0, 0), y2(0,∅)) = u1((0, 0), (0, 0)) =
−1 = u∗1(0, 0).
- At state (0, 1), u∗1(0, 1) = −12 .
(i) If mdev1 = (∅, 1), u
dev
1 ((0, 1),m
dev
1 ,m2) = u1((0, 1), y1(∅, 1)) =
u1((0, 1), (0, 1)) = −1 < u∗1(0, 1).
(ii) If mdev1 = (0, 0), u
dev
1 ((0, 1),m
dev
1 ,m2) =
1
2u1((0, 1), y1(0, 0)) +
1
2u1((0, 1), y2(0,∅)) = −12 = u∗1(0, 1).
(iii) For any other mdev1 inconsistent with equilibrium,
udev1 ((0, 1),m
dev
1 ,m2) = u1((0, 1), y2(0,∅)) = −1 < u∗1(0, 1).
- At state (1, 0), u∗1(1, 0) = −32 .
(i) If mdev1 = (∅, 1), u
dev
1 ((1, 0),m
dev
1 ,m2) = −4 < u∗1(1, 0).
(ii) If mdev1 = (0, 0), u
dev
1 ((1, 0),m
dev
1 ,m2) =
1
2u1((1, 0), y1(0, 0)) +
1
2u1((0, 0), y2(0,∅)) = −2 < u∗1(1, 0).
(iii) For any other mdev1 inconsistent with equilibrium,
udev1 ((1, 0),m
dev
1 ,m2) = u1((0, 0), y2(0,∅)) = −2 < u∗1(1, 0).
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- At state (1, 1), u∗1(1, 1) = −1.
(i) If mdev1 = (∅, 0), u
dev
1 ((1, 1),m
dev
1 ,m2) = u1((1, 1), y2(1,∅)) = −1 =
u∗1(1, 1).
(ii) If mdev1 = (1, 1), u
dev
1 ((1, 1),m
dev
1 ,m2) =
1
2u1((1, 1), y1(1, 1)) +
1
2u1((1, 1), y2(1,∅)) = −1 = u∗1(1, 1).
(iii) For any other mdev1 inconsistent with equilibrium,
udev1 ((1, 1),m
dev
1 ,m2) = u1((1, 1), y2(1,∅)) = −1 = u∗1(1, 1).
Therefore Agent 1 has no incentives to deviate at any state; this is similar for
Agent 2. I have established that above is an equilibrium.
(2) I prove this by showing that any strategy profile in which each agent is vague
on his misaligned dimension and commits on his aligned dimension at some
state is not a weak PBE strategy profile. I prove by contradiction: suppose
that there exists θ and w, z ∈ [−1, 1] such that
s1(θ) = (w,∅),
s2(θ) = (∅, z)
is a weak PBE proposal profile when state is θ.
Step 1. β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 .
If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0, then Agent 1 has a profitable deviation s2(θ). To see
this, first note that
u∗1(θ) = u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), y2(∅, z)) = u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1 − 1, z)).
Now let Agent 1 deviate to s2(θ). Given m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) = ((∅, z), (∅, z))
and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 > pi2. Therefore β(m) = 1 and udev1 (θ,mdev1 , s2(θ)) =
u1(θ, y1(∅, z)) = u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1
, z)) > u∗1(θ).
Similarly, if β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1, then Agent 2 has a profitable deviation s1(θ).
Step 2. w = θ1, z = θ2.
Suppose w , θ1. Then Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅,∅). To see this,
first note that
u∗1(θ) =
1
2
u1(θ, y1(w,∅)) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z))
<
1
2
u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1
, θ
2 − 1)) + 1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z)).
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Now let Agent 1 deviate to mdev1 = (∅,∅). Given m = (m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) =
((∅,∅), (∅, z)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 ≥ pi2. Therefore β(m) ≥ 12 and
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) ≥
1
2
u1(θ, y1(∅,∅)) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z))
=
1
2
u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1
, θ
2 − 1)) + 1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅, z))
> u∗1(θ).
Similarly if z , θ2, then Agent 2 has a profitable deviation (∅,∅).
Step 3. u∗1(θ) = −1.
From the steps above,
u∗1(θ) =
1
2
u1(θ, y1(w,∅)) +
1
2
u2(θ, y2(∅, z))
=
1
2
u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1
, θ
2 − 1)) + 1
2
u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1 − 1, θ2))
= −1.
Step 4. If θ2 = 0, then Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅,−0.4). If θ2 = 1,
then Agent 1 has a profitable deviation (∅, 0.6).
I first consider the case in which θ2 = 0. By Step 2, z = 0. Given
m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) = ((∅,−0.4), (∅, 0)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 >
pi2. Therefore β(m) = 1. udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) = u1(θ, y1(∅,−0.4)) =
u1((θ
1
, 0), (θ1,−0.4)) = −0.36 > −1 = u∗1(θ).
Now I consider the case in which θ2 = 1. By Step 2, z = 1. Given
m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) = ((∅, 0.6), (∅, 1)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 > pi2. Therefore
β(m) = 1. udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) = u1(θ, y1(∅, 0.6)) = u1((θ
1
, 1), (θ1, 0.6)) =
−0.36 > −1 = u∗1(θ).
I have established that Agent 1 has a profitable deviation at θ. Therefore for
no θ ∈ Θ and w, z ∈ [−1, 1] is
s1(θ) = (w,∅),
s2(θ) = (∅, z),
a weak PBE proposal profile.
The next result characterizes intuitive equilibria in the binary-state environment. In
particular, in no equilibria is any Agent i specific about dimension i and vague about
dimension j. As one can see, the simpler state space renders a stronger result.
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Proposition 5 In any intuitive equilibrium with symmetry condition removed, an
agent who is vague on some dimension must be vague on his aligned dimension.
I prove this by first supposing that Agent 1 is vague about his misaligned dimension
and commits on his aligned dimension. Then I show that the proposal profile given
byAgent 1’s strategy and any strategy byAgent 2 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
The case in which Agent 2 is vague on his misaligned dimension and commits on
his aligned dimension is symmetric. The binary state space helps in two ways. First,
because the state space is smaller than the action space, some actions are credible
compromises regardless of the state. Second, since there are altogether only four
different states, each agent can only make four possibly different proposals. This
makes it easy to pin down agents’ equilibrium strategies based on the posterior
beliefs of the DM.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅) for all θ, where q : Θ → [−1, 1]. I
show that s1 is not a strategy in any intuitive equilibrium. The arguments for Agent
2 is symmetric. There are 4 cases:
1. s2(θ) = (∅, z(θ)) for all θ, where z : Θ→ [−1, 1].
2. s2(θ) = (∅,∅) for all θ.
3. s2(θ) = (z(θ),w(θ)) for all θ, where z, w : Θ→ [−1, 1].
4. s2(θ) = (z(θ),∅) for all θ, where z : Θ→ [−1, 1].
For each of the 4 cases, I show that (s1, s2) is not an equilibrium proposal profile.
1. This is shown in Proposition 4.
2. I prove this by contradiction. Suppose the proposal profile is a weak PBE.
Step 1. ∀θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 .
If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0 for some θ, then Agent 1 has a profitable deviation
(∅,∅). To see this, note that
u∗1(θ) = u1(θ, y2(∅,∅)) = u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1 − 1, θ2)).
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Now let Agent 1 deviate to (∅,∅). Given m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) =
((∅,∅), (∅,∅)), β(m) = 12 and
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) =
1
2
u1(θ, y1(∅,∅)) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(∅,∅))
=
1
2
u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1
, θ
2 − 1)) + 1
2
u1((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1 − 1, θ2))
> u∗1(θ).
If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1 for some θ, then Agent 2 has a profitable deviation
(q(θ),∅). The argument is identical to the one used in Step 1 of the proof for
part (2) of the Proposition 4.
Step 2. q(θ) = θ1, ∀θ.
Fix any θ. Let µ denote the DM’s belief at θ. Since β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 ,
pi1 = pi2 = ud ((θ
1
, θ
2
), (θ
1 − 1, θ2)) = −1 given µ. Moreover, given any
µ˜ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 ≤ −1 with equality reached when µ˜{θ˜ | θ˜1 = q(θ)} = 1.
Therefore µ{θ˜ | θ˜1 = q(θ)} = 1. Since µ is consistent with s1 and s2,
q(θ) = θ
1.
Step 3. Agent 2 has a profitable deviation ( 12,∅) at state (1, 0).
From Step 2, (s1(1, 0), s2(1, 0)) = ((1,∅), (∅,∅)). From Step 1 and 2,
u∗2(1, 0) =
1
2u2((1, 0), y1(1,∅)) +
1
2u2((1, 0), y2(∅,∅)) = −1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to ( 12,∅). Given m = (s1(1, 0),m
dev
2 ) =
((1,∅), ( 12,∅)), for all µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 < pi2. To see why, note that if θ1 = 0,
ud (θ, y2(
1
2
,∅)) = ud ((0, θ2), (
1
2
, θ2)) > ud ((0, θ2), (1, θ2−1)) = ud (θ, y1(1,∅)).
On the other hand, if θ1 = 1,
ud (θ, y2(
1
2
,∅)) = ud ((1, θ2), (
1
2
, θ2)) > ud ((1, θ2), (1, θ2−1)) = ud (θ, y1(1,∅)).
So, given any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 < pi2 and β(m) = 0. Therefore
udev2 ((1, 0), s1(1, 0),m
dev
2 ) = u2((1, 0), y2(
1
2,∅)) = u2((1, 0), (
1
2, 0)) = −14 >
−1 = u∗2(1, 0).
3. I prove this by contradiction. Suppose the proposal profile is an equilibrium
proposal profile. First I prove the following 4 claims.
Claim 1 ∀θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) ∈ {0, 12 }.
Proof of Claim 1. If for some θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1, then Agent 2 has a
profitable deviation s1(θ). The argument is identical to the one used in Step
1 of the proof for part (2) of the Proposition 4.
33
Claim 2 If for some θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , then z(θ) = θ1−1 andw(θ) = θ2.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose on the contrary that either z(θ) , θ1 − 1 or
w(θ) , θ2. Then
u∗2(θ) =
1
2
u2(θ, y2(z(θ),w(θ))) +
1
2
u2(θ, y1(q(θ),∅)))
<
1
2
u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1, θ2)) + 12u2(θ, y1(q(θ),∅)).
Now let Agent 2 deviate to (∅,∅). Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
((q(θ),∅), (∅,∅)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 ≤ pi2. Therefore β(m) ≤ 12 and
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) ≥
1
2
u2(θ, y2(∅,∅)) +
1
2
u2(θ, y1(q(θ),∅))
=
1
2
u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1, θ2)) + 12u2(θ, y1(q(θ),∅))
> u∗2(θ).
Claim 3 If for some θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0, then z(θ) = θ1.
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose on the contrary that z(θ) , θ1. Then
u∗1(θ) = u1(θ, y2(z(θ),w(θ)))
= u1((θ1, θ2), (z(θ),w(θ)))
< u1((θ1, θ2), (θ1,w(θ))).
Now let Agent 1 deviate to (∅,w(θ)). Given m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) =
((∅,w(θ)), (z(θ),w(θ))) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 ≥ pi2. Therefore β(m) ≥ 12
and
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) ≥
1
2
u1(θ, y1(∅,w(θ))) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(z(θ),w(θ)))
=
1
2
u1((θ1, θ2), (θ1,w(θ))) +
1
2
u1((θ1, θ2), (z(θ),w(θ)))
> u1((θ1, θ2), (z(θ),w(θ)))
= u∗1(θ).
Claim 4 If for some θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0, then u∗2(θ) ≤ −1.
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Proof of Claim 4. From Claim 3,
u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, y2(s2(θ)))
= u2((θ1, θ2), (z(θ),w(θ)))
= u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1,w(θ)))
≤ u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1, θ2))
= −1.
For the rest of the proof, I fix any θ and show that (s1(θ), s2(θ)) =
((q(θ),∅), (z(θ),w(θ))) cannot be sustained in equilibrium for any q, z,
w : Θ→ [−1, 1]. We divide the discussion into 3 cases.
Case 1 For all θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅), θ˜1 = q(θ).
If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , then u
∗
2(θ) =
1
2u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2u2(θ, y2(s2(θ))) =
1
2u2((θ
1, θ2), (θ1, θ2 − 1)) + 12u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1, θ2)) = −1. On the other
hand, if β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0, then u∗2(θ) ≤ −1 by Claim 4. Therefore in both
situations we have u∗2(θ) ≤ −1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to (q(θ) − 1 + ,∅), where  is a very small positive
number. Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((q(θ),∅), (q(θ) − 1 + ,∅)), we have
that for all θ˜ ∈ Θ2(m), θ˜1 = q(θ). Since for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)),
pi1 = ud ((θ1, θ2), y1(q(θ),∅))
= ud ((θ1, θ2), (θ1, θ2 − 1))
< ud ((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1 + , θ2))
= ud ((θ1, θ2), y2(q(θ) − 1 + ,∅))
= pi2,
we have β(m) = 0. Therefore udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) =
u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1 + , θ2)) = −2 > −1.
Therefore any s1(θ) that belongs to Case 1 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Case 2 For all θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅), θ˜1 , q(θ).
If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , then s2(θ) = (θ
1−1, θ2). Therefore given DM’s belief
µ at θ, pi2 = ud ((θ1, θ2), (θ1−1, θ2)) > pi1, contradicting β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 .
Therefore β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0 and u∗2(θ) ≤ −1.
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Now let Agent 2 deviate to (∅,∅). Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
((q(θ),∅), (∅,∅)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)), pi1 < −1 = pi2. Therefore β(m) =
0 and udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) = u2((θ
1, θ2), (θ1−1, θ2)) = 0 >
u∗2(θ).
Therefore any s1(θ) that belongs to Case 2 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Case 3 There exists θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅) and θ˜1 = q(θ),
and there exists θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅) and θ˜1 , q(θ).
In this case, q(θ) ∈ {0, 1}. We further divide this case into 6 subcases.
Subcase 1 q(θ) = 1. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 1.
If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , then u
∗
2(θ) =
1
2u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2u2(θ, y2(s2(θ))) =
−1. If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0, then u∗2(θ) ≤ −1. Therefore for both situations
we have u∗2(θ) ≤ −1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to (1− ,∅), where  is a very small positive number.
Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((1,∅), (1 − ,∅)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi2 > pi1.
To see why, note that when θ1 = 1,
ud (θ, y1(1,∅)) = ud ((1, θ2), (1, θ2 − 1)) = −1,
while
ud (θ, y2(1 − ,∅)) = ud ((1, θ2), (1 − , θ2)) = −2 < −1.
On the other hand, when θ1 = 0,
ud (θ, y1(1,∅))) = ud ((0, θ2), (1, θ2 − 1)) = −2,
and
ud (θ, y2(1 − ,∅)) = ud ((0, θ2), (1 − , θ2)) = −(1 −  )2 > −2.
So β(m) = 0 and
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 ))
= u2((1, θ2), (1 − , θ2))
= −(1 −  )2
> −1 = u∗2(θ).
Therefore any s1(θ) that belongs to Subcase 1 cannot be sustained in equilib-
rium.
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Subcase 2 q(θ) = 1. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 0.
If s1(θ) falls into this subcase, then there exists θ1 = (1, θb1) such that
(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ1)) and s2(θ1) , s2(θ); otherwise it by defini-
tion contradicts (q(θ),∅) belongs to Case 3.
Moreover, the DM’s belief µ at θ1 must assign probability 0 < p < 1 to
{θ˜ | θ˜1 = 1}. The reason is that, if p = 0, then µ is inconsistent with
equilibrium strategy; if p = 1, then s1(θ1) belongs to Subcase 1, which we
have established as unsustainable in equilibrium.
Since µ is consistent with the equilibrium strategies, there exists θ2 = (0, 1 −
θ2) such that (s1(θ2), s2(θ2)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ1)).
The DM elects Agent 2 with the same probability at states θ1 and θ2 since
(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = (s1(θ2), s2(θ2)). If β(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = 12 , then z(θ1) =
θ11 − 1 = θ12 − 1. This is impossible since θ11 = 1 and θ12 = 0. On the other
hand, if β(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = 0, then z(θ1) = θ11 = θ
1
2 which is also impossible.
Now we have reached a contradiction. Therefore any s1(θ) that belongs to
Subcase 2 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Subcase 3 q(θ) = 1. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ))
and θ˜1 = 1. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ)) and
θ˜1 = 0.
This subcase is ruled out using the argument in the last paragraph of Subcase
2.
Subcase 4 q(θ) = 0. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 1.
We first prove the following claim:
Claim 5 In any equilibrium with (s1(θ), s2(θ)) = ((q(θ),∅), (z(θ),w(θ))),
there does not exist θ such that θ1 = 1 and s1(θ) = (0,∅).
Proof ofClaim5. Suppose on the contrary that s1(θ) = (0,∅) for θ = (1, θ2).
First note that u∗2(θ) = 0, otherwise let Agent 2 deviate to (0,∅). Given
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m = ((0,∅), (0,∅)), since for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 < pi2, we have that β(m) = 0.
Therefore udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) = u2(1, 0) = 0.
Since u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) < 0, we must have β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0 and s2(θ) =
(θ1 − 1, θ2). This contradicts Claim 3.
Now let’s come back to Subcase 4. By definition of Subcase 4, θ1 = 1. By
Claim 5, s1(θ) that falls into Subcase 4 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Subcase 5 q(θ) = 0. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 0.
The argument in first paragraph for Case 1 shows that u∗2(θ) ≤ −1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to (−12,∅). Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
((0,∅), (−12,∅)), by Claim 5, for any θ˜ ∈ Θ2(m), θ˜1 = 0. So for any
µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)), pi1 = −1 < −14 = pi2 and β(m) = 0. So udev2 (θ, s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
u2(θ, y2(mdev2 )) = u2((0, θ
2), ( 12, θ
2)) = −14 > u∗2(θ). Therefore any s1(θ) that
belongs to Subcase 5 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Subcase 6 q(θ) = 0. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ))
and θ˜1 = 1. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ)) and
θ˜1 = 0.
This subcase is ruled out using the argument in the last paragraph of Subcase
2.
Therefore all cases have been shown to be unsustainable in equilibrium.
4. I prove this by contradiction. Suppose the proposal profile is an equilibrium
proposal profile. I first prove the following 3 claims.
Claim 1 β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) ≤ 12 , ∀θ.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose on the contrary that for some θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) =
1. Then u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) = u2((θ
1
, θ
2
), (q(θ), θ
2 − 1)).
Now let Agent 2 deviate to s1(θ). Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
((q(θ),∅), (q(θ),∅)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi2 > pi1. Therefore β(m) = 0
and udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) = u2((θ
1
, θ
2
), (q(θ), θ
2
)) > u∗2(θ).
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Claim 2 If for some θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , then z(θ) = θ1 − 1.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose on the contrary that z(θ) , θ1 − 1. Therefore
u∗2(θ) =
1
2
u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2
u2(θ, y2(s2(θ)))
<
1
2
u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2
u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1, θ2))
=
1
2
u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))).
Now let Agent 2 deviate to (∅,∅). Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
((q(θ),∅), (∅,∅)) and any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 ≤ pi2. Therefore β(m) ≤ 12 and
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) ≥
1
2
u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2
u2(θ, y2(mdev2 ))
=
1
2
u2(θ, y1(s1(θ)))
> u∗2(θ).
Claim 3 β((1,∅), (δ,∅)) = 0, ∀δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Claim 3. Let m = ((1,∅), (δ,∅)). If θ1 = 1, then
ud (θ, y1(m1)) = ud ((1, θ2), (1, θ2 − 1)) = −1,
while
ud (θ − y2(m2)) = ud ((1, θ2), (δ, θ2)) = −(1 − δ)2 > −1.
On the other hand, if θ1 = 0, then
ud (θ − y1(m1)) = ud ((0, θ2), (1, θ2 − 1)) = −2,
while
ud (θ − y2(m2)) = ud ((0, θ2), (δ, θ2)) = −δ2 > −2.
Therefore for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 < pi2 and β(m) = 0.
For the rest of the proof, we fix any θ and divide the discussion into 3
cases to show (s1(θ), s2(θ)) = ((q(θ),∅), (z(θ),∅)) cannot be sustained in
equilibrium for any q, z : Θ→ [−1, 1].
Case 1 For all θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅), θ˜1 = q(θ).
There are two possibilities: β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 and β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1.
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- If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , then by Claim 2,
u∗2(θ) =
1
2
u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2
u2(θ, y2(s2(θ)))
=
1
2
u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1, θ2 − 1)) + 12u2((θ
1, θ2), (θ1 − 1, θ2))
= −1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to (q(θ) − 1 + ,∅) inconsistent with equilibrium,
where  is a very small positive number. This can be done sinceAgent 2makes
at most 4 different proposals in equilibrium. Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
((q(θ),∅), (q(θ) − 1 + ,∅)) and any θ˜ ∈ Θ2(m), θ˜1 = q(θ). Therefore for
any µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)), pi1 = −1 < −(1 −  )2 = ud ((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1 + , θ2)) =
pi2. Therefore β(m) = 0 and udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) =
u2((θ1, θ2), (θ1 − 1 + , θ2)) = −2 > −1 = u∗2(θ).
- If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0, then
u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, y2(s2(θ))) = u2(θ, y2(z(θ),∅)) = −(θ1 − z(θ) − 1)2.
Moreover, given the DM’s belief µ at θ, pi1 < pi2. Since (q(θ),∅) belongs
to Case 1, the DM learns θ1 = q(θ) at θ. Therefore pi1 = −1 < pi2 =
ud ((θ1, θ2), (z(θ), θ2)). Thus |θ1 − z(θ) |< 1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to (z(θ) − ,∅) inconsistent with equilibrium, where
z(θ) −  > θ1 − 1. Therefore θ1 − z(θ) +  ∈ (−1, 1).
Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((q(θ),∅), (z(θ) − ,∅)) and any θ˜ ∈ Θ2(m),
θ˜1 = q(θ). Therefore for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)), pi1 = −1 < −(θ1 − z(θ) +  )2 =
ud ((θ1, θ2), (z(θ) − , θ2)) = pi2. Therefore β(m) = 0 and
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 ))
= u2((θ1, θ2), (z(θ) − , θ2))
= −(θ1 − z(θ) +  − 1)2
> −(θ1 − z(θ) − 1)2
= u∗2(θ).
Therefore s1(θ) that falls into Case 1 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Case 2 For all θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ), θ˜1 , q(θ).
I show that if s1(θ) falls into this case, then z(θ) = θ1−1 and β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) =
0. To see this, suppose the contrary. Then u∗2(θ) < 0. Now let Agent
2 deviate to (∅,∅). Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((q(θ),∅), (∅,∅)) and any
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µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)), pi1 < −1 = pi2. Therefore β(m) = 0 andudev2 (θ, s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
u2(θ, y2(mdev2 )) = 0 > u
∗
2(θ).
Therefore for any s1(θ) that falls into Case 2, Agent 2 is proposing his ideal
action (θ1 − 1,∅) and wins with probability 1.
Case 3 There exists θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅) and θ˜1 = q(θ),
and there exists θ˜ such that s1(θ˜) = s1(θ) = (q(θ),∅) and θ˜1 , q(θ).
In this case, q(θ) ∈ {0, 1}. I further divide this case into 6 subcases.
Subcase 1 q(θ) = 1. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 1.
There are two possibilities: β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 and β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1.
- If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , then by Claim 2, z(θ) = θ
1 − 1 and u∗2(θ) =
1
2u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2u2(θ, y2(s2(θ))) = −1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to an off path (1 − ,∅), where  is a very small
positive number. Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((1,∅), (1 − ,∅)), by Claim 3,
β(m) = 0. Therefore udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) = u2((1, θ
2), (1−
, θ2)) = −(1 −  )2 > −1 = u∗2(θ).
- If β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1, then u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, y2(s2(θ))) =
u2((1, θ2), (z(θ), θ2)) = −(z(θ))2.
Moreover, given the DM’s belief µ at θ, pi1 < pi2. Since s1(θ) belongs to
Subcase 1, the DM learns θ1 = q(θ) = 1 at θ. Therefore pi1 = −1 and
pi2 = ud ((1, θ2), (z(θ), θ2)) = −(1 − z(θ))2, where |1 − z(θ) |< 1. Therefore
z(θ) ∈ (0, 1].
Now let Agent 2 deviate to an (z(θ) − ,∅) inconsistent with equilibrium,
where z(θ) −  ∈ (0, 1). Given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((1,∅), (z(θ) − ,∅)),
by Claim 3, β(m) = 0. Therefore
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 ))
= u2((1, θ2), (z(θ) − , θ2))
= −(z(θ) −  )2
> −(z(θ))2
= u∗2(θ).
41
Therefore s1(θ) that falls into Subcase 1 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Subcase 2 q(θ) = 1. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 0.
If s1(θ) falls into this subcase, then there exists θ1 = (1, θb1) such that
(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ1)) and s2(θ1) , s2(θ); otherwise it con-
tradicts the definition of Case 3 and Subcase 2.
Moreover, the DM’s belief µ at θ1 must assign probability 0 < p < 1 to
{θ˜ | θ˜1 = 1}. The reason is that, if p = 0, then µ is inconsistent with
equilibrium strategies; if p = 1, then s1(θ1) belongs to Subcase 1, which we
have established as unsustainable in equilibrium.
Since µ is consistent with equilibrium strategy, there exists θ2 = (0, 1 − θ2)
such that (s1(θ2), s2(θ2)) = (s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ1)).
The DM elects Agent 2 with the same probability at states θ1 and θ2 since
(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = (s1(θ2), s2(θ2)). If β(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = 12 , then by Claim 2
we have z(θ1) = θa1 − 1 = θa2 − 1. But this is impossible since θ11 = 1 and θ12 =
0. Therefore β(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = 0 and u∗2(θ1) = u2((1, θ
2
1), (z(θ1), θ
2
1)) =
−(z(θ1))2.
I argue that z(θ1) = z(θ2) = 0; otherwise at state θ1, let Agent 2 de-
viate to (,∅) inconsistent with equilibrium such that 0 <  < |z(θ1) |.
Then given m˜ = ((1,∅), (,∅)), β(m˜) = 0 by Claim 3. Therefore
udev2 (θ1, (1,∅), (,∅)) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) = −2 > −(z(θ1))2 = u∗2(θ1).
Therefore we have that β((1,∅), (0,∅)) = 0 since (s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) =
((1,∅), (0,∅)) and β(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) = 0.
This means for any θ˜ such that θ˜1 = 1 and s1(θ˜) = (1,∅), s2(θ˜) = (0,∅) and
u∗2(θ˜) = 0; otherwise, Agent 2 has incentive to deviate to (0,∅).
Now I show that Agent 2 has a profitable deviation at θ2. First note that
u∗2(θ2) = u2(θ2, y2(s2(θ2))) = u2((0, θ
2
2), (0, θ
2
2)) = −1. Now let Agent 2
deviate to ( − 1,∅) inconsistent with equilibrium where  is a very small
positive number. Then given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((1,∅), ( − 1,∅)),
Θ2(m) = {θ˜ | s1(θ˜) = (1,∅),
u∗2(θ˜) ≤ max
β∈BR (Θ,m)
(1 − β)u2(θ˜, y2( − 1,∅)) + βu2(θ˜, y1(1,∅))}.
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For θ˜ such that θ˜1 = 1 and s1(θ˜) = (1,∅), since
u∗2(θ˜) = 0 > u2(θ˜, y1(1,∅))
and
u∗2(θ˜) = 0 > u2(θ˜, y2( − 1,∅)),
we have
u∗2(θ˜) > max
β∈BR (Θ,m)
(1 − β)u2(θ˜, y2( − 1,∅)) + βu2(θ˜, y1(1,∅)).
Therefore for any θ˜ ∈ Θ2(m), θ˜1 = 0. Thus for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)),
pi1 = ud ((0, θ˜2), y1(1,∅)) = ud (0, θ˜2), (1, θ˜2 − 1)) = −2
while
pi2 = ud ((0, θ˜2), y2( − 1,∅)) = ud ((0, θ˜2), ( − 1, θ˜2)) = −(1 −  )2 > −2.
So β(m) = 0 and
udev2 (θ2, (1,∅), ( − 1,∅)) = u2((0, θb2), y2( − 1,∅))
= u2((0, θb2), ( − 1, θb2))
= −2
> −1
= u∗2(θ2).
Therefore s1(θ) that falls into Subcase 2 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Subcase 3 q(θ) = 1. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ))
and θ˜1 = 1. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((1,∅), s2(θ)) and
θ˜1 = 0.
Let θ1 = (0, θ21) and θ2 = (1, θ
2
2) be such that (s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) =
(s1(θ2), s2(θ2)). The same argument from Subcase 2 shows that Agent 2
has incentive to deviate at θ2. Therefore s1(θ) that falls into Subcase 3 cannot
be sustained in equilibrium.
Subcase 4 q(θ) = 0. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 0.
I first prove the following claim:
Claim 4 If for some θ = (1, θ2), s1(θ) = (0,∅), then s2(θ) = (0,∅) and
β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0.
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Proof of Claim 4. u∗2(θ) = 0; otherwise, Agent 2 has a profitable de-
viation (0,∅). To see this, note that given m = ((0,∅), (0,∅)), for any
µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi1 < pi2 and therefore β(m) = 0. Therefore udev2 (θ, s1(θ),mdev2 ) =
u2(θ, y2(mdev2 )) = 0.
Since u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) < 0, we have that β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0 and that s2(θ) =
(0,∅).
Now let’s come back to Subcase 4. There are two possibilities: z(θ) > −1
and z(θ) = −1.
- If z(θ) > −1, then Agent 2 has a profitable deviation to (z(θ) − ,∅)
inconsistent with equilibrium where z(θ) −  > −1. To see this, note that
given m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((0,∅), (z(θ) − ,∅)), by Claim 4, any θ˜ with
θ˜1 = 1 does not belong to Θ2(m). Therefore if θ˜ ∈ Θ2(m), then θ˜1 = 0. Thus
for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ2(m)), pi1 < pi2 and β(m) = 0. So
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 ))
= u2((0, θ2), y2(z(θ) − ,∅))
= −(z(θ) + 1 −  )2
> −(z(θ) + 1)2
= u2(θ, y2(s2(θ)))
≥ u∗2(θ).
The last inequality comes from the following observation: if an agent wins
with positive probability, then he weakly prefers the outcome from his own
proposal to that from his opponent’s proposal. To see this, fix any θ. Let
(s1(θ), s2(θ)) be denoted by m. Suppose that β(m) > 0 and u1(θ, y1(m1)) <
u1(θ, y2(m2)). Therefore u∗1(θ) < u1(θ, y2(m2)). Now let Agent 1 devi-
ate to mdev1 = (∅,∅). Then u
dev
1 (θ,m
dev
1 ,m2) ≥ u1(θ, y2(m2)) > u∗1(θ),
making mdev1 a profitable deviation. This means that β(m) > 0 implies
u1(θ, y1(m1)) ≤ u1(θ, y2(m2)). The case for Agent 2 is similar.
- z(θ) = −1. Let µ be the DM’s belief at θ. Then by the definition of Subcase
4, µ{θ˜ | θ˜1 = 0} = 1. Given m = (s1(θ), s2(θ)) = ((0,∅), (−1,∅)) and µ,
pi1 = pi2. Therefore β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 and u
∗
2(θ) =
1
2u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2u2(θ, y2(s2(θ))) = −1.
Now let Agent 2 deviate to ( − 1,∅) inconsistent with equilibrium. Given
m = (s1(θ),mdev2 ) = ((0,∅), ( − 1,∅)), same argument for the z(θ) > −1
case above shows that for any θ˜ ∈ Θ(m), θ˜1 = 0. Therefore β(m) = 0
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and udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) = u2((0, θ
2), ( − 1, θ2)) = −2 >
u∗2(θ).
Therefore if s1(θ) falls into Subcase 4, then it cannot be sustained in equilib-
rium.
Subcase 5 q(θ) = 0. For all θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ)),
θ˜1 = 1.
By the definition of Case 3 and Subcase 5, there exists θ1 = (0, θb1) such that
s1(θ1) = (0,∅) and s2(θ1) , s2(θ). Then the DM’s belief µ at θ must assign
probability 0 < p < 1 to {θ˜ | θ˜1 = 0}: if p = 0, then µ is inconsistent with
equilibrium strategies; if p = 1, then s1(θ1) falls into Subcase 4, which we
have shown to be unsustainable in equilibrium.
Therefore there exists θ2 = (1, θ22) such that (s1(θ2), s2(θ2)) =
(s1(θ1), s2(θ1)). The same argument in Subcase 2 shows that Agent 2 has a
profitable deviation at θ1.
Therefore if s1(θ) falls into Subcase 5, then it cannot be sustained in equilib-
rium.
Subcase 6 q(θ) = 0. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ))
and θ˜1 = 1. There exists θ˜ such that (s1(θ˜), s2(θ˜)) = ((0,∅), s2(θ)) and
θ˜1 = 0.
Let θ1 = (0, θb1) and θ2 = (1, θ
b
2) be such that (s1(θ1), s2(θ1)) =
(s1(θ2), s2(θ2)). Same argument for Subcase 5 shows that Agent 2 has a
profitable deviation at θ1.
Therefore if s1(θ) falls into Subcase 6, then it cannot be sustained in equilib-
rium.
So the only sustainable case is Case 2. Therefore in any equilibrium in which
(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = ((q(θ),∅), (z(θ),∅)) for all θ, z(θ) = θ1 − 1, q(θ) , θ1, and
β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0.
Now let Agent 1 deviate to (∅,∅) at any state θ. Given m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) =
((∅,∅), (θ1 − 1,∅)), for any θ˜ ∈ Θ1(m), θ˜1 = 1 + z(θ). Therefore for any
µ ∈ ∆(Θ1(m)), pi1 = −1 = pi2 and β(m) = 12 . Hence, udev1 (θ,mdev1 , s2(θ)) =
−1 > −2 = u∗1(θ). (∅,∅) is a profitable deviation for Agent 1.
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Appendix III. N dimensions
I focus on the case in which for each dimension k ∈ N , there is i ∈ {1, 2} such that
|bki |< |bkj |. That is, for each dimension, one agent is more aligned with the DM than
his opponent. I call such a dimension j Agent i’s aligned dimension and Agent j’s
misaligned dimension. The set of Agent i’s aligned dimensions is denoted by Ni.
The following result shows that in this environment, agents should not be vague on
their misaligned dimensions and commit on their aligned dimensions.
Proposition 6 For i ∈ {1, 2}, suppose that ∀k ∈ Ni, s ji (θ) = θ j − b ji ; otherwise
ski (θ) = ∅. Then (s1, s2) is not part of an equilibrium strategy profile. Furthermore,
suppose that for each i, whenever k ∈ Ni, |bki |= 0. For all k ∈ Ni, ski (θ) ∈ R;
otherwise ski (θ) = ∅. Then (s1, s2) is not part of an equilibrium strategy profile.
The intuition of the result is similar as the previously-analyzed environment with
two dimensions and completely (mis)aligned agents. First, if such (s1, s2) is part
of an intuitive equilibrium, then the outcome must be a tie, otherwise the losing
agent can mimic the winning agent’s proposal and win. Second, each specific
commitment must be its proposer’s ideal action. To see this, suppose that Agent i
commits on dimension k and that his commitment is not equal to θk − bki . Then let
Agent i deviate to be vague on all dimensions. The DM then believes that Agent
i will implement his own ideal action, whereas Agent j will at best implement his
own ideal action. Therefore Agent i’s probability of winning after the deviation
is no worse than in equilibrium and his winning proposal is strictly better than in
equilibrium. Lastly, given that specific commitment is revealing about the state, the
undercutting argument destroys the equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that for all θ, for ∀k ∈ Ni, ski (θ) = θk − bki ;
otherwise ski (θ) = ∅. In equilibrium, both agents propose their ideal actions.
Step 1. β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , ∀θ.
Suppose on the contrary that β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1 for some θ. Then
u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) = u2(θ, θ − b1) = −‖b1 − b2‖2.
Let Agent 2 deviate to s1(θ). Given m = (s1(θ), s1(θ)), the DM believes that
only Agent 2 has deviated. Let y2 = (y12, y
2
2) be Agent 2’s policy. For k ∈ N1,
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sk2 (θ) = θ
k − bk1 so yk2 = θ
k − bk1 . For k ∈ N2, sk2 (θ) = ∅ so yk2 = θ
k − bk2 .
pi1 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, θ − b1)µdθ = −‖b1‖2,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, y2(s1(θ)))µdθ = −
∑
k∈N1
|bk1 |2−
∑
k∈N2
|bk2 |2> −‖b1‖2.
So β(m) = 0 and
udev2 (θ,m
dev
2 , s1(θ)) = u2(θ, y2(s1(θ))) = −
∑
k∈N1
|bk1 − bk2 |2> u∗2(θ).
s1(θ) is then a profitable deviation for Agent 2. The proof is similar for when
β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0 for some θ. Since β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12∀θ, the DM is indifferent
between agents. Since both agents propose their ideal actions, we can only have
‖b1‖= ‖b2‖. Therefore for all θ,
u∗1(θ) = −
1
2
‖b1 − b2‖2.
Step 2. Agent 1 has a profitable deviation.
At θ, let Agent 1 deviate to mdev1 such that: for some n ∈ N2, mdev,n1 = θ
n− (1−  )bn1.
mdev,k1 = ∅ for all k , n. Given m = (m
dev
1 , s2(θ)), the DM believes that only Agent
1 has deviated since mdev1 < supp(G1). Therefore µ{θ˜ | θ˜n = sn2 (θ) + bn2} = 1.
pi2 = −‖b2‖2,
pi1 = −
∑
k,n
|bk1 |2−|(1 −  )bn1 |2> −‖b1‖2= −‖b2‖2.
So β(m) = 1 and Agent 1 gets arbitrarily close to outcome b1, which makes mdev1 a
profitable deviation.
Now suppose that for each i, |bki |= 0 for all k ∈ Ni. Consider putative equilibrium
strategies for agents as follows:
sk1 (θ) = w
k (θ),∀k ∈ N1,∀θ; sk1 (θ) = ∅,∀k ∈ N2,∀θ,
sl2(θ) = z
l (θ),∀l ∈ N2,∀θ; sl2(θ) = ∅,∀l ∈ N1,∀θ,
where wk : Θ→ R for k ∈ N1 and zl : Θ→ R for l ∈ N2.
Step 1. β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 for all θ.
Suppose on the contrary that β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1 for some θ. Then
u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, y1(s1(θ))) = −
∑
k∈N1
|θk − bk2 − sk1 (θ) |2−
∑
k∈N2
|bk1 − bk2 |2.
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Now let Agent 2 deviate to s1(θ). Given m = (s1(θ), s1(θ)), for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ),
pi1 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, y1(s1(θ)))µdθ =
∫
Θ
−
∑
k∈N1
|θk − sk1 (θ) |2µdθ −
∑
k∈N2
|bk1 |2,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, y2(s1(θ)))µdθ =
∫
Θ
−
∑
k∈N1
|θk − sk1 (θ) |2µdθ −
∑
k∈N2
|bk2 |2.
Since for any k ∈ N2, |bk1 |> |bk2 |, −
∑
k∈N2 |bk1 |2< −
∑
k∈N2 |bk2 |2. So pi1 < pi2 and
β(m) = 0.
udev2 (θ) = −
∑
k∈N1
|θk − bk2 − sk1 (θ) |2−
∑
k∈N2
|bk2 − bk2 |2> u∗2(θ),
making s1(θ) a profitable deviation for Agent 2.
Step 2. For all k ∈ N1, wk (θ) = θk − bk1 for all θ; for all l ∈ N2, zl (θ) = θl − bl2
for all θ.
Without loss of generality, I assume that ‖b1‖≤ ‖b2‖. Suppose for some θ and some
k ∈ N1, wk (θ) , θk − bk1 . Then
u∗1(θ) =
1
2
u1(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(s2(θ)))
=
1
2

∑
k,k∈N1
−|θk − sk1 (θ) − bk1 |2−|θ
k − wk (θ) − bk1 |2
 +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(s2(θ)))
<
1
2

∑
k,k∈N1
−|θk − sk1 (θ) − bk1 |2
 +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(s2(θ))).
Let Agent 1 deviate to mdev1 = (∅,∅, . . . ,∅) at θ. Given m = (m
dev
1 , s2(θ)), the DM
believes that only Agent 1 has deviated and
pi1 = −‖b1‖2≥ −‖b2‖2,
pi2 = −
∫
Θ
ud (θ, y2(s2(θ)))µdθ =
∫
Θ
−
∑
l∈N2
|θl − zl (θ) |2µdθ −
∑
k∈N1
|bk2 |2≤ −‖b2‖2.
Therefore β(m) ≥ 12 and
udev1 (θ) ≥
1
2
u1(θ, y1(mdev1 )) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(s2(θ))) =
1
2
u1(θ, y2(s2(θ))) > u∗1(θ),
making mdev1 a profitable deviation. Therefore for all k ∈ N1, wk (θ) = θk − bk1 for
all θ. This implies that for all θ, pi1 = ud (θ, θ − b1) = −‖b1‖2. Since β(m) = 12 for
all θ and for all µ ∈ ∆(Θ), pi2 ≤ −‖b2‖2≤ pi1, above s1 and s2 can only be sustained
in equilibrium if ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖. Given that ‖b1‖= ‖b2‖, I can use the argument above
to show that for all l ∈ N2, zl (θ) = θl − bl2.
Step 3. Agent 1 has a profitable deviation.
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This step is identical to the Step 2 in the first part of the proof.
Appendix IV. General Preferences of the DM
Now we focus back on the case in which there are two dimensions and agents’
ideal outcomes are (0, 1) and (1, 0). Let the DM’s payoff function be ud (θ, y) =
−(θ1− ya)2−α(θ2− yb)2, where 0 < α < 1. Agents’ payoff functions are as before:
u1(θ, y) = −(θ1 − y1)2 − (θ2 − y2 − 1)2,
u2(θ, y) = −(θ1 − y1 − 1)2 − (θ2 − y2)2.
Since ud (θ, y1(∅,∅)) = −α, uV (θ, y2(∅,∅)) = −1, ∀θ, Agent 1 has an overall
advantage. The next result shows that in this case, agents should not be vague on
their misaligned dimensions and commit on their aligned dimensions.
Proposition 7 Suppose that b1 = (0, 1) and b2 = (1, 0) and the DM weighs dimen-
sion 1 more than dimension 2. In all equilibria with vagueness, vagueness occurs
on agents’ aligned dimensions.
The intuition is simple. The same argument as before show that each agent wins
with probability 12 , which means that Agent 1 cannot get his own ideal action with
probability 1. Now let Agent 1 deviate to be vague on both dimensions. Then the
DM believes that Agent 1 will implement his own ideal action, while Agent 2 will
at best implement his own ideal action, which is strictly less preferred to Agent 1’s.
Therefore Agent 1 wins with probability 1 and gets his own ideal action.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose on the contrary that for all θ,
s1(θ) = (w(θ),∅),
s2(θ) = (∅, z(θ)).
From Lemma 1, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 for all θ. Therefore u
∗
1(θ) < 0 for all θ.
Let Agent 1 deviate to (∅,∅) at θ. Given m = (mdev1 , s2(θ)) and for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ),
pi1 = −α,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
ud (θ, y2(∅, z(θ)))µdθ ≤ −‖b2‖2= −1 < pi1
So β(mdev1 , s2(θ)) = 1 and
udev1 (θ, (∅,∅), s2(θ)) = u1(θ, y1(∅,∅)) = 0 > u
∗
1(θ),
making (∅,∅) a profitable deviation for Agent 1.
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Appendix V. Committing to Subsets of Actions
So far, the definition of vagueness is a complete lack of commitment, which is
equivalent to committing to the entire action space. One may also think of a
less extreme kind of vagueness and let agents commit to strict subsets of actions.
Formally, let Mi = (2R)2 and si : Θ → (2R)2. So for each dimension, an agent can
choose an arbitrary subset of the action space to commit to. Note that the previous
notion of vagueness is committing to R under this new definition.
The next proposition shows that it is still not part of an equilibrium in which both
agents are specific about their aligned dimensions, as long as vagueness on their
misaligned dimensions is equivalent to committing to the entire action set.
Proposition 8 Suppose that b1 = (0, 1), b2 = (1, 0). Let y, z : Θ → R and
A, B : Θ → 2R be such that θ2 − b21 ∈ A(θ) and θ1 − b12 ∈ B(θ) for all θ. Then
s1(θ) = (w(θ), A(θ)), s2(θ) = (B(θ), z(θ)) cannot be supported in an equilibrium.
In other words, there does not exist an equilibrium in which each agent is specific
about his aligned dimension and committing to a subset containing his ideal action
on his misaligned dimension.
The idea of the proof is very similar to the previous case, where the agents can only
choose between being precise and complete vagueness. For simplicity I focus on
the case in which b1 = (0, 1) and b2 = (1, 0). Note first that as long as a subset
contains the proposer’s ideal action, the action that will be implemented is his ideal
action. The proof consists of three steps. First, each agent wins with probability 12 .
The reason is, if some agent wins, the losing agent can deviate to mimic the winner’s
proposed action on his specific dimension and commit to R on the winner’s vague
dimension. Now two agents are both specific on the loser’s misaligned dimension.
On the loser’s aligned dimension, both implement their ideal actions. So now the
loser is preferred by the DM and wins with a strictly better outcome on his aligned
dimension. Next, w(θ) = θ1 − b11 and z(θ) = θ2 − b22. That is, on their specific
dimensions, both agents commit to their ideal actions. If an agent commits to an
alternative action at some state, then he can deviate to (R,R). The DM believes that
the deviator will implement his ideal action, while the non-deviator will implement
his ideal action at best. Since the DM is indifferent between two agents’ ideal
actions, the deviator wins with probability at least 12 with a strictly better winning
outcome. Lastly, now any agent can undercut as before by committing to R on his
aligned dimension and promise an aligned action on his misaligned dimension.
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With the option to choose arbitrary levels of vagueness, the previous equilibria
remain. In the current notation, they are written as:
s1(θ) = s2(θ) = (R,R),∀θ
and when b1 = (0, 1), b2 = (1, 0),
s1(θ) = (R, {θ2 − b21}), s2(θ) = ({θ1 − b12},R),∀θ.
Complete vagueness precludes undercutting by opponents while preserving own
ideal action. However, there is difficulty extending these results to partial vagueness.
For example, in order to sustain
s1(θ) = (A(θ),w(θ)), s2(θ) = (z(θ), B(θ)),∀θ,
we need to make sure that A(θ) does not reveal θ1 and B(θ) does not reveal θ2.
As one can see, the key reason for undercutting to carry through is revelation of
the state. With complete vagueness, this can always be done because as long as an
agent is always completely vague, his proposal does not reveal the state. Moreover,
he has incentive to do so because being completely vague guarantees his ideal
action. However, if an agent is only allowed to be partially vague, i.e. committing
to A(θ) $ R, then it is harder to satisfy both conditions. In order not to reveal the
state, the agent will need to be pooling, so A(θ) cannot reveal the state perfectly.
Moreover, to ensure that the agent is willing to commit to A(θ) and not R, A(θ)
must be sufficiently close to the agent’s ideal action, if not containing it.
Proof of Proposition 8. I show that if s1, s2 is as follows, then some agent has an
incentive to deviate:
s1(θ) = (w(θ), A(θ)),
s2(θ) = (B(θ), z(θ)),
where w, z : Θ→ R and A, B : Θ→ 2R and θ2 − 1 ∈ A(θ), θ1 − 1 ∈ B(θ) for all θ.
Step 1. β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 12 , ∀θ.
Suppose for some θ, β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 1. (The case in which β(s1(θ), s2(θ)) = 0
is symmetric.) Then
u∗2(θ) = u2(θ, y1(w(θ), A(θ))) = −|θ
1 − w(θ) − 1|2−1.
Let Agent 2 deviate to mdev2 = (w(θ),R) at θ. Then given m =
((w(θ), A(θ))), (w(θ),R)), for any µ ∈ ∆(Θ),
pi1 =
∫
Θ
−(θ1 − w(θ))2µdθ − 1,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
−(θ1 − w(θ))2µdθ > pi1.
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Therefore β(m) = 0 and
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(w(θ),R)) = −|θ
1 − w(θ) − 1|2> u∗2(θ),
making mdev2 a profitable deviation.
Step 2. w(θ) = θ1, z(θ) = θ2 for all θ.
Suppose for some θ, w(θ) , θ1 (the case for which z(θ) , θ2 is symmet-
ric). Then u1(θ, y1(s1(θ))) < 0. Let Agent 1 deviate to (R,R). Given
m = ((R,R), (B(θ), z(θ))), The DM believes that only Agent 1 has deviated. There-
fore
pi1 = −‖b1‖2= −1,
pi2 = −|b12 |2−
∫
Θ
|z(θ) − θ2 |2µdθ ≤ −|b12 |2= −1.
Since pi2 ≤ pi1, β(m) ≥ 12 and
udev1 (θ,m
dev
1 , s2(θ)) ≥
1
2
u1(θ, y1(R,R)) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(s2(θ)))
>
1
2
u1(θ, y1(s1(θ))) +
1
2
u1(θ, y2(s2(θ))),
making mdev1 a profitable deviation.
So for all θ, w(θ) = θ1 and z(θ) = θ2.
u∗2(θ) =
1
2
(0) − 1
2
(−2) = −1.
Step 3. Agent 2 has a profitable deviation.
Let Agent 2 deviate to (θ1−1+ ,R) at θ. Given m = ((w(θ), A(θ)), (θ1−1+ ,R)),
the DM believes that only Agent 2 has deviated. Therefore µ{θ˜ | θ˜1 = w(θ)} = 1.
pi1 = −1,
pi2 =
∫
Θ
[θ1 − (θ1 − 1 +  )]2µdθ = −(1 −  )2 > pi1.
So β(m) = 0 and
udev2 (θ, s1(θ),m
dev
2 ) = u2(θ, y2(m
dev
2 )) = −2 > u∗2(θ)
for small enough  > 0, making mdev2 a profitable deviation for Agent 2.
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C h a p t e r 2
BIASED BELIEF UPDATING IN DYNAMIC
EXPERIMENTATION
2.1 Introduction
One repeatedly observed phenomenon in gambling studies is the “near miss ef-
fect,” which is the gambling-reinforcing effect of a failure perceived as close to a
win. I formally define the near miss effect and offer an theoretical explanation.
The explanation is not new and is based on evidence and theories in psychology.
The framework is general and can be applied to other situations in which the de-
cision maker learns how much control she has over a stochastic outcome through
experimentation.
Gambling is popular in the United States. In 2007 alone, 55 million people made
376 million trips to casinos (Barberis, 2012). This paper focuses on a robust and
particularly puzzling aspect of gambling behavior. When encountering a loss that is
perceived as close to a win, gamblers increase their desire to play. In an experiment
by Clark et al. (2009), subjects complete a two-reel slot machine task in which
they select the icon on the first reel and wait for the icon on the second reel to be
realized. A win in this task is a match between the two icons located at the payline
on both reels. A near miss is a mismatch in which a matching icon is right above or
below the payline. Other outcomes are called full misses. In half the trials subjects
choose personally the icon on the first reel, while the computer chooses for them
for the rest of the trials. After choice on the first reel is made, subjects are asked
“how do you rate your chance of winning?” After the icon on the second reel is
realized, they are asked “how pleased are you with the result?” and “how much do
you want to continue playing?” Two results stand out. First, when the choice of
the icon on the first reel is made personally, subjects report higher ratings of chance
of winning. Second, although both near misses and full misses give no payoffs,
compared with full misses (i.e. mismatches which are not near misses), near misses
increase subjects’ desire to play. However, this increase is restricted to trials in
which subjects have personal control over the first reel.
The first result indicates that subjects seem to believe that their actions matter and
that they have certain skills in picking the “right” icon - they believe the chance
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of winning is higher when they choose the icon on the first reel themselves. The
increased desire to play even when no payoff is realized conditional on placing the
gamble themselves seems to indicate that subjects derive favorable information from
a near miss, which has to do with their skill. I discuss other evidence in Subsection
2.1.
The story I give is as follows. The gambler believes that she has a fixed but unknown
skill, which may or may not affect her probability of success. If it does, then a higher
skill combined with a luck factor leads to a higher success rate. If it does not, then
a higher skill is canceled out by a luck factor and as a result the success rate is
unchanged. As she plays, she updates her belief about her skill and whether it
matters to the outcome. Although a near miss does not yield any payoff, it increases
the gambler’s perceived success rate through a feedback of high skill but low chance
that her skill matters.
To be more specific, there are three possible outcomes from each round of play: a
success, a near miss and a failure. A success yields a fixed, positive payoff while
both a failure and a near miss yield zero payoff. So the gambler only cares about the
success rate.
She has two models of how the gambling task operates in mind and is unsure which
one is true: the skill model or the chance model. In both models, outcomes are
realized in two sequential stages. A signal is generated in each stage which can be
either good or bad. If a bad signal is generated in the first stage, the outcome is a
failure. If good signals are generated in both stages, the outcome is a success. If a
good signal is generated in the first stage and a bad signal in the second stage, the
outcome is a near miss.
The signal realization of the first stage is interpreted as the result of skill, which is
the probability that the prerequisite of success is reached. If not, then the outcome
is a failure. If yes, then luck comes in at the second stage which determines whether
the outcome is a success or a near miss. The skill factor is common for both models,
so the probability of the prerequisite being met is the same. The models differ in
terms of their chance factors. In the skill model, the probability of good luck is
positive while that in the chance model is zero. As a result, conditional on the
prerequisite being met the skill model generates more successes than the chance
model. Moreover, a high skill translates into a high success rate only in the skill
model.
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The gambler knows the luck factor for each model, but is not sure about which
model is true. She is also uncertain about the skill factor which is common for
both models. Given this setup, it is easy to see how a near miss may increase the
gambler’s valuation for gambling. If she knows for sure that the skill model is true,
then a near miss indicates high skill which translates into a high success rate. If
she knows for sure that the chance model is true, then a near miss is meaningless
because although it also indicates high skill, it does not affect the success rate. Given
a fixed skill, a near miss is more likely to come from a chance model, decreasing the
gambler’s belief that her skill matters. Overall, a near miss increases the perceived
success rate if it signals high skill more than it signals a chance model.
One may question the assumption that a gambler is uncertain about whether her
skill matters in an “obvious” chance model such as gambling. There is ample
experimental evidence indicating that it is very easy to induce subjects to believe that
their action matters in purely chance-driven tasks (Langer, 1975). By introducing
into lotteries factors which would affect the success rate in a task in which skill
matters, such as competition, familiarity with the task and involvement, she induce
the subjects to believe that their skill matters. In other words, the subjects exhibit
“the illusion of control.” Therefore it is reasonable to assume that at least when the
gambler first starts playing, her prior assigns a positive probability to the skill model
being the true one.
I model the gambler’s problem as a infinite, discrete period two-armed bandit. In
each period, she decides whether to pull a risky arm or a safe arm. The risky
arm generates three possible outcomes: success, failure and near miss. Outcomes
are observed instantaneously after the gambler pulls the risky arm. The safe arm
gives a fixed, known payoff. Given the gambler’s belief, there is an index function
representing her willingness to play. The gambler exhibits the near miss effect if the
index function increases after a near miss is observed.
Instead of characterizing beliefs for which the gambler exhibits the near miss effect,
I parametrize a gambler by her bias λ and show the existence of near miss effect for
large enough λ for arbitrary beliefs. The advantage of this approach lies in that it
does not rely on the specification of the gambler’s prior beliefs; nor does it require
an explicit formula of the index function.
The bias is defined as follows. The gambler’s belief about whether the task is a
skill model or a chance model is sticky and updated more slowly than Bayesian. In
particular, her posterior belief that the task is a skill model is a convex combination
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of her prior and the Bayesian posterior, with the weight assigned to the prior being
λ ∈ [0, 1]. When λ = 0, the gambler is Bayesian. When λ = 1, the gambler is fully
biased and does not update.
I now discuss the implication of biased updating. Since the gambler updates about
her skill in a Bayesian way but updates slowly about what kind of task she is faced
with, she essentially over-attributes an outcome towards her skill. In other words,
she believes that she hasmore control over the outcome than she actually does. Apart
from the illusion of control, this assumption is also reminiscent of the fundamental
attribution error, which is a tendency to attribute an outcome more towards the
personal factor rather than the situational factor.
As an example of the fundamental attribution error, in E. E. Jones and V. A. Harris
(1967) subjects were presented essays and were asked to infer from them the attitude
of the essay writers. Even when told that the essays were written when the writers
had little choice about what attitude to express, subjects still believed that thewriters’
attitude is consistent with that expressed in their essays. Therefore when an outcome
is the result of both a personal factor and a situational factor, people believe that the
personal factor is responsible.
To see the connection between the experiment and this paper, notice that the skill
takes the place of the personal factor and the type of task the gambler is faced with
(i.e. skill or chance model) takes the place of the situational factor. We learn from
the experiment that subjects, knowing that the task is a chance model in which the
personal factor does not matter (or matter very little), still attribute the outcome
towards the personal factor. In this paper, for any non-degenerate belief about the
personal and situational factor, the gambler relatively underestimates the effect of
the situational factor and overestimates that of the personal factor.
Using this approach, I give some conditions in terms of the bias level under which
the gambler exhibits the near miss effect. I show that for any given belief about the
gambling task, a Bayesian gambler values gambling more than a biased gambler.
Moreover for any belief, if the probability of a success conditional on a non-failure
is high enough in a skill model, then whenever a Bayesian gambler exhibits the near
miss effect, then so does a biased gambler. Lastly, for any belief there is a cutoff
bias level such that a more biased gambler exhibits the near miss effect.
I want to emphasize that it is not my intention to simply rationalize the data by
incorporating biases. If one is only concerned about rationalizing as much data as
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possible, then arguably there are simpler models which do not require the two-stage
construction. My intention is to depict the mechanism through which people learn
two things at once: how skillful they are, and whether their skill matters. In this
situation, one common mistake is to over-estimate one’s control over the outcome
- both the illusion of control and fundamental attribution error are evidence of
this mistake. They lead to the modeling choice that (1) the gambler believes that
the gambling task is a skill model with positive probability, and (2) the gambler
over-attributes the outcome towards her skill. One can certainly make the gambler
under-attribute the outcome towards her skill by updating aggressively about the
type of task she is faced with, but that would not be appropriate for the situation I
am trying to model.
A direct application of the model is a technology firm’s innovation process. R&D
involves multiple layers of uncertainty. The skill of the R&D team determines
whether a breakthrough occurs in the product development stage. Conditional
on a breakthrough, the market demand then determines whether the product will
be profitable. Therefore both factors determine the profitability of R&D and the
decision maker of the firm learns about them through dynamic experimentation.
In this context, the decision maker’s bias lies in over-estimation of howmuch control
the R&D team has over the outcome. For example, when the market demand is low
because the line of products the firm produces is dated, the decision maker attributes
it to the R&D team’s failure to make the product appealing. In the event of this bias,
a decision maker values R&D less compared to the case with no bias. Moreover,
she is more likely to continue R&D even under the feedback that the market demand
is low for her line of products. This is because she treats it as good news about
something she has control over - her team - more than she treats it as bad news about
something she does not have control over - the market.
As an indirect application, I also use this experimentation framework to study a
worker’s occupation switching. When a worker considers what career to choose a
job from as well as what job to choose, often there is uncertainty over how well-
equipped she is for a career as well as whether a job is a good fit. When the outcome
from experimenting with a job can be a success, a failure or a near miss, I study
what outcomes trigger a job or career switch.
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Related Literature
The near miss effect is widely studied in psychology and gambling. It is long
recognized in psychology literature that near misses increase gambling propensity
(Reid, 1986). Experiments manipulating the frequency of near misses have shown
effects on slot machine gambling persistence (Kassinove and Schare, 2001; Côté
et al., 2003; MacLin et al., 2007).1 People differ in their physiological responses to
a near miss and a full miss (Qi et al., 2011).
This paper is also related to biased information processing. Experimental evidence
consistently suggests that people process information in a biased manner. Möbius et
al. (2014) find that subjects update too little in response to both positive and negative
feedback. Moreover, they over-weight positive feedback relative to negative. Eil and
Rao (2011) find that subjects deviate more from Bayes’ rule in response to negative
feedback than positive feedback. Ertac (2011) compares subjects’ deviation from
Bayes’ rule when processing information with and without self-relevance and finds
evidence of pessimism in response to negative feedback in the self-relevance context.
A series of evidence of underreaction of stock prices to news announcements is
surveyed in Bernard (1992).
Some theoretical models depart from classical models by modifying Bayes’ rule.
Compte and Postlewaite (2004) is probably the most closely related to this paper.
They model confidence-enhanced performance and make two assumptions: perfor-
mance is affected by perceived empirical frequency of success rate in the past, and
the perceived frequency differs from the actual frequency. It is shown that when con-
fidence affects performance, biased perception may be welfare enhancing. Although
the framework is very similar to mine, they assume that there is no experimentation
and the agent engages in the risky activity iff the expected payoff equals the cost.
Jehiel (2005) and Eyster and Rabin (2005) each put forward an equilibrium notion
in which players best response according to non-standard beliefs. In Jehiel (2005),
instead of learning other players’ behavior at each decision node, players bundle their
decision nodes into analogy classes and best respond to the others’ average behavior
within each class. In Eyster and Rabin (2005), players underestimate information
contained in other people’s actions and therefore do not update sufficiently.
1Depending on the experiment setup, there are different operational definitions of near misses.
For example, near miss is defined as 2 identical symbols on the first two reels followed by a third
different symbol on the third reel in Côté et al. (2003); it is defined as the case when three out of the
four slots are of the same number, with the last number being different, e.g. 3 3 3 7 in Kassinove and
Schare (2001). MacLin et al. (2007) specify near miss to be two winning symbols on the payline
and the final winning symbol directly above or below the payline.
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There is a vast literature on dynamic experimentation focusing on rational experi-
menters. Rothschild (1974) is the first known model of a seller learning about the
demand by charging different prices and observing the results. The main conclusion
is that firms do not acquire perfect information in learning about the demand. As a
result, some firms charge incorrect prices, which explains the persistence of price
diversity. Keller and Rady (1999) studies the seller’s problem in an environment
subject to random changes. Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977) studies a
problem in which a buyer decides whether to buy from seller whose value is un-
certain and shows that learning induces a buyer to buy more of the drug compared
with when no learning takes place. Bar-Isaac (2003) considers a situation in which
both the buyer and the seller are uncertain about the value of the seller’s product.
Another series of studies look at many-agent experimentation and studies the strate-
gic interaction between experimenters (Bergemann and Välimäki, 1996; Bolton and
C. Harris, 1999; Keller, Rady, and Cripps, 2005; Keller and Rady, 2010; Klein and
Rady, 2011).
2.2 The Model
Consider an infinitely-lived player, who chooses between undertaking a risky activity
(st = 1) or not (st = 0) in period t = 1, 2, . . .. Undertaking the activity in period t
generates a stochastic outcomeYt carrying a reward. Yt ∈ {0, 1, 1′}where 0 represents
a failure, 1 represents a success, and 1′ represents a near miss. Yt is drawn from a
distribution contingent on the realization of ω. ω can be either g (good) or b (bad).
If ω = g,
Yt =

0 with probability 1 − q,
1 with probability q,
1′ with probability q(1 −  ).
and if ω = b,
Yt =

0 with probability 1 − q,
1 with probability q′,
1′ with probability q(1 − ′),
where  > ′. Therefore in both states of the world, an outcome has the same
probability to be a failure. Conditional on the outcome not being a failure, more
successes are generated when ω = g. The player gets a payoff of 1 from a success
and 0 from a near miss or a failure. Not undertaking the activity results in a payoff
of c0 in the current period.
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Nature selects ω ∈ {g, b} and q ∈ [0, 1], which are fixed throughout the time. The
player knows  and ′, but is unsure about ω and q. Her initial belief about ω is
characterized by a prior probability ξ0 ∈ (0, 1) that ω = g. Her initial belief about
q is denoted by a distribution F0 with the density f 0. I assume that both ω and q
are independent and have non-degenerate distributions.
After each period of undertaking the risky activity, the player observes the realization
of the outcome and updates her beliefs about ω and q. Specifically, given any prior
belief (ξ, f ) and newly realized outcomeY = y, a Bayesian player’s updated belief is
as follows. She updates her belief f about q upwards to f + after observing a success
or a nearmiss, downwards to f − after observing a failure. Letting µ f =
∫ 1
0 q f (q)dq,
we have
f +(q) =
q f (q)∫ 1
0 q˜ f (q˜) dq˜
=
q f (q)
µ f
,
f −(q) =
(1 − q) f (q)∫ 1
0 (1 − q˜) f (q˜) dq˜
=
(1 − q) f (q)
1 − µ f .
Since a failure is generated with the same probability when ω is good and bad, the
player updates her belief ξ about ω only if the outcome is not a failure. Since the
good state generates successes with higher probability than the bad state, she updates
ξ upwards to ξ+ after observing a success and downwards to ξ− after observing a
near miss. Letting g(ξ) = ξ + (1− ξ)′ denote the probability of an outcome being
a success given that it is not a failure, we have
ξ+ =
ξ
ξ + (1 − ξ)′ =
ξ
g(ξ)
,
ξ− =
ξ (1 −  )
ξ (1 −  ) + (1 − ξ)(1 − ′) =
ξ (1 −  )
1 − g(ξ) .
A biased player updates about q in the same way as a Bayesian, but underreacts to
information pertaining to updating about ω. Let χ ∈ [0, 1] be the bias of the player
and ξ+( χ) and ξ−( χ) be the updated beliefs after observing a success and a near
miss, respectively. We have
ξ+( χ) = χξ + (1 − χ) ξ
ξ + (1 − ξ)′ = χξ + (1 − χ)
ξ
g(ξ)
,
ξ−( χ) = χξ + (1 − χ) ξ (1 −  )
ξ (1 −  ) + (1 − ξ)(1 − ′) = χξ + (1 − χ)
ξ (1 −  )
1 − g(ξ) .
Therefore the posterior of a player with bias χ is the sum of her prior weighted by
χ and the Bayesian posterior weighted by (1 − χ). A player with χ = 0 is called a
Bayesian player. A player with χ = 1 is called a fully biased player. To summarize,
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let x = (ξ, f , χ) be the state of the following dynamic programming problem:
Vˆ (x) = max
{ c0
1 − δ ; r (x) + δE[Vˆ ( x˜) |x]
}
,
where δ is the discount factor and r (x) = g(ξ)µ f is the expected utility from a
single-period reward given x. If xt = (ξ, f , χ), then
xt+1 =

(ξ+( χ), f +, χ) with probability g(ξ)µ f ,
(ξ−( χ), f +, χ) with probability [1 − g(ξ)]µ f ,
(ξ, f −, χ) with probability (1 − µ f ).
To summarize, the player faces a two-armed bandit problem and chooses between
a safe arm and a risky arm in each period t. The safe arm generates a fixed payoff
of c0. The risky arm generates an expected payoff of r (x). Then based on the
outcome realization, xt evolves into xt+1, which determines the expected value for
choosing the risky arm in the next period. The solution for this problem is provided
by the Gittins Index (D.M. Jones and Gittins, 1972) and later summarized by Kumar
(1985):
Theorem 1 (Gittins and Jones) There is a real-valued function ν : X → R such
that for all x, the optimal action is to play the risky arm iff ν(x) ≥ c0. Moreover,
for each x, ν is defined as follows: let V˜ (x, c) := max
{
c
1−δ ; r (x) + δE[V˜ ( x˜, c) |x]
}
.
Then ν(x) := inf
{
c : V˜ (x, c) = c1−δ
}
.
For each x, the value of the risky arm is calibrated by an arm giving fixed payoff
ν(x). The optimal strategy is then to play the risky arm iff ν(x) ≥ c0. Instead of
being just the per-period expected reward payoff r (x), the calibration also takes into
account the value for experimentation. The calibrated value is the smallest fixed
reward such that the player weakly prefers getting the fixed reward of the calibrating
arm each period from now on, to playing the risky arm for one more period and
facing the same problem next period.
To see that ν(x) is well-defined, note that for c > 1, V˜ (x, c) = c1−δ . In other
words, when the reward from the calibrating arm exceeds the best possible reward
from the risky arm, the optimal action is to play the calibrating arm. Therefore
{c : V˜ (x, c) = c1−δ } is nonempty. When c < 0, the optimal action is to play the risky
arm, so {c : V˜ (x, c) = c1−δ } is bounded below by 0.
To simplify later exposition, define
V (x, c) := V˜ (x, c) − c
1 − δ = max{0; r (x) − c + δE[V ( x˜, c) |x]} := max{0;W (x, c)}.
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So
ν(x) = inf{c : W (x, c) ≤ 0}.
Proposition 9 For each x, c = ν(x) is the unique solution to the equationW (x, c) =
0.
The proof closely follows that of Lemma 1 in Rothschild (1974). I present it here
since the proof strategy will be used throughout the paper. In order to show that
W (x, c) = 0 has a unique solution, I show that it is continuous and strictly decreasing
in c. In proving the continuity of W , I define W t recursively as the expected value
of experimenting for one more period when there are t periods left. The actualW is
obtained by taking t to infinity. The continuity of W follows from the fact that the
uniform limit of continuous functions is continuous.
Proof. I defineW (x, c) and V (x, c) recursively as follows:
V 0(x, c) = 0,
W t (x, c) = r (x) − c + δE[V t−1( x˜, c) |x],
V t (x, c) = max{0,W t (x, c)},
V (x, c) = lim
t→∞V
t (x, c),W (x, c) = lim
t→∞W
t (x, c).
To see that limt→∞W t (x, c) and limt→∞ V t (x, c) exist, first note that for each (x, c),
V t (x, c) andW t (x, c) increase in t. This is because the player can always imitatewhat
she would do when there are fewer periods left and stop early. Second, for each t and
(x, c), V t (x, c) and W t (x, c) are bounded above by 11−δ . This is because the player
cannot get a payoff higher than 1 per period. Therefore V (x, c) = limt→∞ V t (x, c)
andW (x, c) = limt→∞W t (x, c) exist.
Now I show that W (x, c) is continuous in c by showing that it is continuous in
(ξ, χ, c). I will use this result in the future.
First I show by induction thatW t (x, c) is continuous in (ξ, χ, c) for each t. For the
case of t = 1,W1(x, c) = g(ξ)µ f −c is clearly continuous in (ξ, χ, c). Now suppose
W t (x, c) is continuous in (ξ, χ, c). Since the function max{·, ·} is continuous,
V t (x, c) is also continuous in (ξ, χ, c).
W t+1(x, c) = g(ξ)µ f
− c + δµ f
[
g(ξ)V t (ξ+( χ), f +, χ, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−( χ), f +, χ, c)
]
+ δ(1
− µ f )V t (ξ, f −, χ, c),
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and ξ+( χ) and ξ−( χ) are both continuous in (ξ, χ, c), so isW t+1(x, c). SoW t (x, c)
is continuous in (ξ, χ, c) for all t.
Now I show thatW t (x, c) uniformly converges toW (x, c). LetW t (x, c) denote the
discounted sum of expected payoff for t periods, using the optimal policy intended
for infinite periods. Then we have
W t (x, c) ≥ W t (x, c),
W (x, c) −W t (x, c) ≤ δ
t
1 − δ .
Therefore,
W (x, c) ≤ W t (x, c) + δ
t
1 − δ ≤ W
t (x, c) +
δt
1 − δ .
So
|W t (x, c) −W (x, c) |≤ δ
t
1 − δ .
Since the above inequality does not depend on (ξ, χ, c), convergence is uniform.
Uniform limit of continuous functions is continuous, so W (x, c) is continuous in
(ξ, χ, c).
Since W (x, c) is continuous in c, W (x, 0) ≥ 0, and W (x, 1) ≤ 0 for all x, by the
intermediate value theorem there exists c ∈ [0, 1] such that W (x, c) = 0 for each
x. Since r (x) − c is strictly decreasing in c and V (x, c) is weakly decreasing in
c, W (x, c) is strictly decreasing in c. So the solution to W (x, c) = 0 exists and is
unique for each x.
2.3 Main Results
I show two implications of biased updating on experimentation. First, bias decreases
a player’s value for experimentation. When a Bayesian player and a player with
arbitrary bias have the same beliefs, the Bayesian player values experimentation
more. Second, bias more likely leads to a stronger near miss effect. For any belief,
as long as the conditional probability of success is high enough, the near miss effect
is stronger for a biased player than for a Bayesian player. As for its existence, for
any belief there is a cutoff bias level such that a player above this level exhibits the
near miss effect.
Proposition 10 Suppose that ξ > 0 and χ ∈ [0, 1]. Then for any (ξ, f ), ν(ξ, f , 0) ≥
ν(ξ, f , χ).
With the same belief, the Gittins index of the Bayesian player is higher than that of a
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biased player. The proof has two main steps. The first step shows that the Bayesian
player’s value function V (ξ, f , 0, c) is convex in ξ. The second step shows that,
conditional on getting a non-failure, the expected value function is higher when the
arguments are the Bayesian posteriors than the biased posteriors. Intuitively, since
Bayesians posterior is more dispersed than the biased posterior, the expected value
of a convex function of the Bayesian posterior is higher than that for the biased
posterior. The full proof is presented in the Appendix.
Now we consider how bias leads to the near miss effect. Since the value for
experimentation can be characterized by the Gittins index, a player exhibits the near
miss effect if the Gittins index increases after a near miss is observed.
Definition 4 A player at state (ξ, f , χ) exhibits the near miss effect if N (ξ, f , χ) =
ν(ξ−( χ), f +, χ) − ν(ξ, f , χ) > 0. For x1 = (ξ1, f1, χ1) and x2 = (ξ2, f2, χ2), the
near miss effect is stronger for x1 than x2 if N (x1) > N (x2).
Proposition 10 facilitates comparison of the near miss effect between players. Since
we know that if the Gittins index is higher for the Bayesian player, it suffices to know
the relationship of the Gittins index for both players after a near miss is observed.
As it turns out, as long as the conditional probability of success when ω = g is high
enough, the Gittins index for a Bayesian player is lower than that of a biased player.
Proposition 11 Given ξ > 0, f , χ ∈ (0, 1], there exists ∗ such that for all  > ∗,
N (ξ, f , 0) < N (ξ, f , χ). That is, if successes are generated with high enough
probability when ω = g, then all else equal, an arbitrarily biased player exhibits a
stronger near miss effect than a Bayesian player.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose the conditional probability of success when
ω = g is 1. In other words, near miss occurs with probability 0. Then whenever a
Bayesian player observes a near miss, her belief ξ is updated to 0. Since she will not
update ξ any more, she is equivalent to a fully biased player with belief ξ = 0. At
this point, her value function is lower than that of a fully biased player with belief
ξ > 0. The same relationship holds for the Gittins index of both players. I then use
the continuity of the Gittins index in  to show that for  close to 1, the Gittins index
of the biased player is higher than that of a Bayesian player.
The next result gives conditions for the nearmiss effect. Nearmiss effect is frequently
observed in slot machine gambling. In this stylized experimentation, a player learns
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about the realization of each wheel and update her belief about the profitability of
gambling. A near miss will lead her to increase her belief about the wheels with
good realizations and decrease that about the wheels with bad realizations. It is easy
to see that if the player does not update her belief about the bad wheels sufficiently,
than a nearmiss will be a good news overall. The next result formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 12 For all (ξ, f ) where f is not a one-point distribution, there exists
χ∗(ξ, f ) such that χ > χ∗(ξ, f ) implies that N (ξ, f , χ) > 0.
The proof first shows that the near miss effect is stronger for a fully biased player
than a Bayesian player. Since the Gittins index is continuous in bias, the same
relationship holds for a sufficiently biased player.
2.4 Application: Career and Job Mobility
Consider a worker trying to choose a job and a career. Each career consists of
different jobs. Both the fit of the worker for a career and a job are uncertain. In
order to learn about these uncertainties, she need to experiment with a job. The
outcome from experimentation contains both job- and career-specific information.
For example, a worker may choose to become an economist by first experimenting
with research in macroeconomics. In the process, she may learn about her ability or
fit for a career in economics as well as for a job in macroeconomics. While it is easy
to learn whether she has the basic required skill for the career, learning about job-
specific information is conditional on her having acquired the basic skills. Inability
to produce a publishable result in macroeconomics may lead her to doubt her ability
to engage in economic research in general, but not whether macroeconomics is
indeed an appropriate field for her. The latter can only be learnt after she has
produced a publishable result and sent it to a journal.
In this environment, learning is conditional on the worker’s decision to experiment
as well as the outcome of experimentation. Based on the result of learning, the
worker may choose to continue experimenting with the current job, or to switch
between jobs and careers. The question I am interested in is what causes a worker
to switch between jobs or careers. Below I show that total failure leads to career
switching but not job switching, while failure which is perceived close to success
may lead to both.
A worker is faced with M possible career choices. Careerm ∈ M consists of |K (m) |
jobs to choose from. Let (m, k) denote job k of career m. Each career has a specific
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set of quantifiable skills. Skills for career m is quantified by qm ∈ [0, 1], interpreted
as the probability that the worker satisfies the prerequisites for a success for any job
within the career. In the event that she does not satisfy the prerequisites, the outcome
is declared a failure. Otherwise, she is able to further learn about the current job,
which can be good or bad. If the outcome is a success, she gets a fixed payoff;
otherwise she gets zero payoff. a failure leads to update only about her belief about
the career-specific skill, while a non-failure also leads to update about job-specific
information. The conditional probability of success is  when a job is good and
′ <  when a job is bad. In each period t = 1, 2, . . ., the worker chooses a job to
work on. I assume that the worker’s skill for any career remains fixed regardless of
which job she chooses to work on, and that there is no switching cost.
Let (ξ(m,k), fm) denote the worker’s current belief about the quality of job k of
career m and her skill about career m. The value of the job is measured by its
Gittins index ν(ξ(m,k), fm). Let’s consider how ν(ξ(m,k), fm) evolves based on the
outcome observed. First, note that the current job the worker is experimenting with
must be the one with the highest Gittins index. That is, if the worker is currently
experimenting with (m∗, k∗), then ν(ξ(m∗,k∗), fm∗ ) ≥ ν(ξ(m′,k ′), fm′) for all m′ ∈ M
and k′ ∈ K (m′). Now consider the case in which the worker gets a success. This
leads to an increase in both ξ(m∗,k∗) and fm∗ . So for any job (m∗, k), its Gittins index
becomes ν(ξ(m∗,k), f +m∗ ) and job (m
∗, k∗)’s Gittins index becomes ν(ξ+(m∗,k∗), f
+
m∗ ).
Since ν(ξ(m∗,k∗), fm∗ ) ≥ ν(ξ(m∗,k), fm), ν(ξ+(m∗,k∗), f +m∗ ) ≥ ν(ξ(m∗,k), f +m∗ ). For jobs
outside of career m∗, their Gittins indices remain unchanged. Therefore the current
job (m∗, k∗) remains the one with the highest Gittins index and the worker does not
make switches.
Now suppose that the worker satisfies the prerequisite for a success but eventually
is met with a failure. Then her belief about job (m∗, k∗) becomes (ξ−(m∗,k∗), f
+
m∗ ) and
her belief about any other job in the career (m∗, k) becomes (ξ(m∗,k), f +m∗ ). Here
three things may happen. Job (m∗, k∗) may continue to be the most lucrative job in
career m∗, in which case she makes no switches. Otherwise, she could switch to a
different job or career.
Lastly, suppose that the worker is met with a failure without satisfying the prerequi-
site for a success. Then her belief about job (m∗, k∗) becomes (ξ(m∗,k∗), f −m∗ ) and her
belief about any other job in career m∗ (m∗, k) becomes (ξ(m∗,k), f −m∗ ). In this case,
all jobs in career m∗ has become less attractive, but (m∗, k∗) remains the best within
career m∗. The worker may switch, but she would not make a within-career switch.
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If in addition the worker underreacts in learning about job-specific information, then
a near miss makes the worker insufficiently update her belief about job (m∗, k∗). As
a result, she is less likely to make a switch of any kind after a near miss. Since the
worker only makes switches within a career after a near miss, underreaction leads
to fewer job changes within a career.
2.5 Conclusion
I study a dynamic experimentation problem in which the experimenter is biased
in her belief updating. The experimenter updates about two unknown parameters
and under-reacts to information pertaining to one parameter. As a result of con-
servatism, she over-attribute the outcome observed to the other parameter. I show
that attribution bias leads to undervaluation of experimentation. Moreover, a biased
player is more susceptible of the near miss effect frequently observed in slot ma-
chine gambling. As an application of the model, I analyze a worker’s career and job
switching choice.
Appendix
I first prove a useful lemma.
Lemma 2 For all (ξ, f , c), g(ξ)max
{
0, g(ξ+)µ f + − c
}
+ [1 −
g(ξ)] max
{
0, g(ξ−)µ f + − c
}
≥ max
{
0, g(ξ)µ f + − c
}
.
Proof. First note that g(ξ)g(ξ+) + [1 − g(ξ)]g(ξ−) = g(ξ). Indeed, the RHS is
Pr(1 | {1, 1′}) in the current period and the LHS is the expected value Pr(1 | {1, 1′})
in the next period.
Second, note that 0 ≤ g(ξ+) > g(ξ) > g(ξ−) ≤ 1. There are four cases.
Case 1. g(ξ+)µ f − c ≤ 0. Both LHS and RHS equal 0.
Case 2. g(ξ)µ f − c ≤ 0 < g(ξ+)µ f − c. LHS = g(ξ)[g(ξ+)µ f + − c] ≥ 0 ≥ RHS.
Case 3. g(ξ−)µ f − c ≤ 0 < g(ξ)µ f − c.
LHS = g(ξ)[g(ξ+)µ f + − c]
≥ g(ξ)[g(ξ+)µ f + − c] + [1 − g(ξ)][g(ξ−)µ f + − c]
= g(ξ)µ f + − c = RHS.
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Case 4. g(ξ−)µ f − c > 0.
LHS = g(ξ)[g(ξ+)µ f + − c] + [1 − g(ξ)][g(ξ−)µ f + − c]
= g(ξ)µ f + − c = RHS.
Now I introduce some notation. For any K ∈ N, ξa1a2...aK where ai ∈ {+,−} is the
Bayesian posterior obtained by the operation a1 on ξ, then a2 on ξa1 , then a3 on
ξa1a2 , . . . , and finally aK on ξa1,...,aK−1 . Similarly for f a1a2...aK .
Lemma 3 For each (ξ, f , c),
g(ξ)V t (ξ+, f +, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−, f +, 0, c) ≥ V t (ξ, f +, 0, c).
Proof. I prove by induction. When t = 1, the statement is exactly Lemma 2. Now
suppose the statement holds for t. First note that
g(ξ)V t+1(ξ+, f +, 0, c) + [1
− g(ξ)]V t+1(ξ−, f +, 0, c) = g(ξ)max{0,W t+1(ξ+, f +, 0, c)} + [1
− g(ξ)] max{0,W t+1(ξ−, f +, 0, c)} = max{0, g(ξ)W t+1(ξ+, f +, 0, c)} +max{0, [1
− g(ξ)]W t+1(ξ−, f +, 0, c)} ≥ max
{
0, g(ξ)W t+1(ξ+, f +, 0, c) + [1
− g(ξ)]W t+1(ξ−, f +, 0, c)
}
.
By the definition ofW t+1,
g(ξ)W t+1(ξ+, f +, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]W t+1(ξ−, f +, 0, c) = g(ξ)
{
g(ξ+)µ f +
−c+δµ f +g(ξ+)V t (ξ++, f ++, 0, c)+δµ f +[1−g(ξ+)]V t (ξ+−, f ++, 0, c)+δ(1
− µ f + )V t (ξ+, f +−, 0, c)
}
+ [1 − g(ξ)]
{
g(ξ−)µ f +
−c+δµ f +g(ξ−)V t (ξ−+, f ++, 0, c)+δµ f +[1−g(ξ−)]V t (ξ−−, f ++, 0, c)+δ(1
− µ f + )V t (ξ−, f +−, 0, c)
}
.
Using the induction hypothesis,
≥ g(ξ)[g(ξ+)µ f + − c] + g(ξ)δµ f +V t (ξ+, f ++, 0, c) + δg(ξ)(1
− µ f + )V t (ξ+, f +−, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)][g(ξ−(0))µ f + − c] + [1
− g(ξ)]δµ f +V t (ξ−, f ++, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]δ(1 − µ f + )V t (ξ−, f +−, 0, c).
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Using the first step of the proof of Lemma 2,
= g(ξ)µ f + − c+ δg(ξ)[µ f +V t (ξ+, f ++, 0, c) + (1− µ f + )V t (ξ+, f +−, 0, c)]+ δ[1
− g(ξ)][µ f +V t (ξ−, f ++, 0, c) + (1 − µ f + )V t (ξ−, f +−, 0, c)].
Regrouping the terms,
= g(ξ)µ f +−c+δµ f +
{
g(ξ)V t (ξ+, f ++, 0, c)+[1−g(ξ)]V t (ξ−, f ++, 0, c)
}
+δ(1
− µ f + )
{
g(ξ)V t (ξ+, f +−, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−, f +−, 0, c)
}
.
Using the induction hypothesis again on the δ(1 − µ f + ) branch,
≥ g(ξ)µ f + − c + δµ f +
{
g(ξ)V t (ξ+, f ++, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−, f ++, 0, c)
}
+ δ(1
− µ f + )V t (ξ, f +−, 0, c).
By definition,
= W t+1(ξ, f +, 0, c).
To summarize, we have shown that
g(ξ)W t+1(ξ+, f +, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]W t+1(ξ−, f +, 0, c)
≥ W t+1(ξ, f +, 0, c),
which implies
g(ξ)V t+1(ξ+, f +, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t+1(ξ−, f +, 0, c)
≥ V t+1(ξ, f +, 0, c).
This concludes the induction procedure.
Proof of Proposition 10
Lemma 4 - 7 establish Proposition 10. Given a sequence a1, a2, . . ., I define the
sequence {zi} as follows: let ξa0 = ξ. For i ≥ 1:
zi =

g(ξa1a2...ai−1 ) if ai = +,
1 − g(ξa1a2...ai−1 ) if ai = −.
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Lemma 4 Fix  and ′. For each K ∈ N, z1 · z2 . . . · zK is linear in g(ξ).
Proof. I prove by induction on K . When a1 = +, z1 = g(ξ). When a1 = −,
z1 = 1 − g(ξ). Either way, z1 is linear in g(ξ). Suppose z1 · z2 . . . · zK−1 is linear in
g(ξ). Then
z1 · z2 . . . · zK =

g(ξ)(z2 · z3 . . . · zK ) if a1 = +,
[1 − g(ξ)](z2 · z3 . . . · zK ) if a1 = −.
Since z2 · z3 . . . · zK is linear in g(ξa1 ) by the induction hypothesis and
g(ξa1 ) =

g(ξ+) if a1 = +,
g(ξ−) if a1 = −,
it suffices to show that g(ξ)g(ξ+) and [1− g(ξ)]g(ξ−) are both linear in g(ξ). First,
g(ξ)g(ξ+) = g(ξ)g(
ξ
g(ξ)
)
= g(ξ)
[
( − ′) ξ
g(ξ)
+ ′
]
= ( − ′)ξ + ′g(ξ)
= g(ξ) − ′ + ′g(ξ)
and therefore is linear in g(ξ). Moreover, by the proof of Lemma 2, we know that
g(ξ)g(ξ+) + [1 − g(ξ)]g(ξ−) = g(ξ).
Since [1−g(ξ)]g(ξ−) = g(ξ)−g(ξ)g(ξ+), it is also linear in g(ξ). So z1 · z2 . . . · zK
is linear in g(ξ).
Lemma 5 For each K ≥ 2, a1, a2, . . . , aK−1 ∈ {+,−}, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1,
z1 · z2 . . . · zi ·WK−i (ξa1a2...ai, f , 0, c)
is convex in ξ.
Proof. I prove by induction. When K = 2, it suffices to show that z1 ·W1(ξa1, f , 0, c)
is linear in ξ.
z1 ·W1(ξa1, f , 0, c) = z1[g(ξa1 )µ f − c] =

g(ξ)[g(ξ+)µ f − c] if a1 = +,
[1 − g(ξ)][g(ξ−)µ f − c] if a1 = −,
both are linear in g(ξ) by Lemma 4. Since g(ξ) is linear in ξ, both are linear in ξ
also.
Now suppose that for all K ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1,
z1 · z2 . . . · zi ·WK−i (ξa1a2...ai, f , 0, c)
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is convex in ξ. I want to show that for all K + 1 ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ K ,
z1 · z2 . . . · zi ·WK+1−i (ξa1a2...ai, f , 0, c)
is also convex in ξ. Notice that
z1 ·WK (ξa1, f , 0, c) = z1g(ξa1 )µ f − cz1 + z1δµ f g(ξa1 )max{0,WK−1(ξa1+, f +, 0, c)}
+ z1δµ f [1 − g(ξa1 )] max{0,WK−1(ξa1−, f +, 0, c)}
+ z1δ(1 − µ f )max{0,WK−1(ξa1, f −, 0, c)}
is guaranteed to be convex if the followings hold:
1. z1g(ξa1 )µ f − cz1 is linear in ξ;
2. z1g(ξa1 )WK−1(ξa1+, f +, 0, c) is convex in ξ;
3. z1[1 − g(ξa1 )]WK−1(ξa1−, f +, 0, c) is convex in ξ;
4. z1WK−1(ξa1, f −, 0, c) is convex in ξ.
1 is shown above in the K = 2 case. 4 comes from the induction hypothesis that
z1 · WK−1(ξa1, f , 0, c) is convex in ξ. 2 and 3 will hold if for all a1, a2 ∈ {+,−},
z1 · z2 ·WK−1(ξa1a2, f , 0, c) is convex. Therefore to show that z1 ·WK (ξa1, f , 0, c)
is convex, it suffices to show that z1 · z2 ·WK−1(ξa1a2, f , 0, c) is convex. Notice that
z1z2WK−1(ξa1a2, f , 0, c) = z1z2[g(ξa1a2 )µ f − c]
+ δµ f
{
g(ξa1a2 )z1z2max{0,WK−2(ξa1a2+, f +, 0, c)}
+ [1 − g(ξa1a2 )]z1z2max{0,WK−2(ξa1a2−, f +, 0, c)}
}
+ δ(1 − µ f )z1z2max{0,WK−2(ξa1a2, f −, 0, c)}
is convex if we can show that z1 · z2 · z3 · WK−2(ξa1a2a3, f , 0, c) is convex for all
a1, a2, a3 ∈ {+,−} (since z1 · z2WK−2(ξa1a2, f−, 0, c) is convex from the induction
hypothesis. Following this logic, it suffices to show the convexity of
z1 · z2 . . . · zKW1(ξa1a2...aK , f , 0, c),
which is equal to
z1 · z2 . . . · zK [g(ξa1a2...at )µ f − c] = z1 · z2 . . . zK · zK+1µ f − cz1 · z2 . . . · zK
when aK+1 = +. It is linear in g(ξ) by Lemma 4, and hence linear (and convex) in
ξ.
Lemma 6 V t (ξ, f , 0, c) is convex in ξ.
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Proof. Since V t (ξ, f , 0, c) = max{0,W t (ξ, f , 0, c)}, it suffices to showW t (ξ, f , 0, c)
is convex in ξ. I prove by induction.
W1(ξ, f , 0, c) = g(ξ)µ f − c is linear in ξ and therefore convex in ξ. Suppose that
W t (ξ, f , 0, c) is convex in ξ. Then
W t+1(ξ, f , 0, c) = g(ξ)µ f − c + δµ f
{
g(ξ)max{0,W t (ξ+, f +, 0, c)}
+ [1 − g(ξ)] max{0,W t (ξ−, f +, 0, c)}
}
+ δ(1 − µ f )max{0,W t (ξ, f −, 0, c)}
is guaranteed to be convex if:
1. g(ξ)W t (ξ+, f +, 0, c) is convex;
2. [1 − g(ξ)]W t (ξ−, f +, 0, c) is convex;
3. W t (ξ, f −, 0, c) is convex.
3 follows from induction hypothesis. 1 and 2 follow from Lemma 5.
Lemma 7 Let χ > 0. Then for any (ξ, f , c), g(ξ)V t (ξ+, f , 0, c) + [1 −
g(ξ)]V t (ξ−, f , 0, c) ≥ g(ξ)V t (ξ+( χ), f , 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−( χ), f , 0, c).
Proof. For each ξ, define two random variables Yand Z as follows:
Y =

ξ+ with probability g(ξ),
ξ− with probability 1 − g(ξ).
Z =

ξ+( χ) with probability g(ξ),
ξ−( χ) with probability 1 − g(ξ).
Simple calculations show that E[Y ] = E[Z]. Since ξ− < ξ−( χ) <
ξ+( χ) < ξ+, Z is Y ’s mean-preserving spread. Therefore Z
second-order stochastic dominates Y . Since V t (ξ, f , 0, c) is convex
in ξ, g(ξ)V t (ξ+, f , 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−, f , 0, c) = E[V t (Y, f , 0, c)] ≥
E[V t (Z, f , 0, c)] = g(ξ)V t (ξ+( χ), f , 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−( χ), f , 0, c).
Proof of Proposition 10. First, I prove by induction that W t (ξ, f , 0, c) ≥
W t (ξ, f , χ, c) for all t. W1(ξ, f , 0, c) = W1(ξ, f , χ, c) = g(ξ)µ f − c. Now suppose
thatW t (ξ, f , 0, c) ≥ W t (ξ, f , χ, c). Then
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W t+1(ξ, f , 0, c) = g(ξ)µ f
− c + δµ f
{
g(ξ)V t (ξ+, f +, 0, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−, f +, 0, c)
}
+ δ(1
− µ f )V t (ξ, f −, 0, c)
≥ g(ξ)µ f − c+ δµ f
{
g(ξ)V t (ξ+( χ), f +, 0, c)+ [1− g(ξ)]V t (ξ−( χ), f +, 0, c)
}
+ δ(1
− µ f )V t (ξ, f −, 0, c)
≥ g(ξ)µ f −c+δµ f
{
g(ξ)V t (ξ+( χ), f +, χ, c)+ [1−g(ξ)]V t (ξ−( χ), f +, χ, c)
}
+δ(1
− µ f )V t (ξ, f −, χ, c)
= W t+1(ξ, f , χ, c).
The first inequality follows from Lemma 7. The second inequality follows from the
induction hypothesis.
This concludes the induction. Since W t (ξ, f , 0, c) ≥ W t (ξ, f , χ, c) for all t,
W (ξ, f , 0, c) = limt→∞W t (ξ, f , 0, c) ≥ limt→∞W t (ξ, f , χ, c) = W (ξ, f , χ, c). Fi-
nally, note that bothW (ξ, f , 0, c) andW (ξ, f , χ, c) strictly decrease in c. ν(ξ, f , 0)
and ν(ξ, f , χ) solves W (ξ, f , 0, c) = 0 and W (ξ, f , χ, c) = 0, respectively. There-
fore ν(ξ, f , 0) ≥ ν(ξ, f , χ).
Proof of Proposition 11
Lemma 8 ν(ξ, f , χ) ≥ ν(ξ, f , 1) for χ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. I prove by induction that W t (ξ, f , χ, c) ≥ W t (ξ, f , 1, c). First note that
W1(ξ, f , χ, c) = W1(ξ, f , 1, c) = g(ξ)µ f − c. Now suppose W t (ξ, f , χ, c) ≥
W t (ξ, f , 1, c). A consequence of this is V t (ξ, f , χ, c) ≥ V t (ξ, f , 1, c).
W t+1(ξ, f , χ, c) = g(ξ)µ f
− c + δµ f
[
g(ξ)V t (ξ+( χ), f +, χ, c) + [1 − g(ξ)]V t (ξ−( χ), f +, χ, c)
]
+ δ(1
− µ f )V t (ξ, f −, χ, c)
≥ g(ξ)µ f − c + δµ fV t (ξ, f +, χ, c) + δ(1 − µ f )V t (ξ, f −, χ, c)
≥ g(ξ)µ f − c + δµ fV t (ξ, f +, 1, c) + δ(1 − µ f )V t (ξ, f −, 1, c)
= W t+1(ξ, f , 1, c).
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The first inequality follows from Lemma 3. Note that its proof does not rely
on χ = 0. The second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis. This
concludes the induction. Therefore W (ξ, f , χ, c) ≥ W (ξ, f , 1, c), which implies
that ν(ξ, f , χ) ≥ ν(ξ, f , 1).
For the next lemma, we need the following implicit function theorem for non-
differentiable functions:
Theorem 2 (Kumagai, 1980) Let F : Rn × Rm → Rn be a continuous mapping.
Suppose that
F (x0, y0) = 0.
There exist open neighborhoods A0 ⊂ Rn and B0 ⊂ Rm of x0 and y0 , respectively,
such that, for all y ∈ B0, the equation
F (x, y) = 0
has a unique solution
x = Hy ∈ A0,
where H is a continuous mapping from B0 into A0 iff there exist open neighborhoods
A ⊂ Rn and B ⊂ Rm of x0 and y0, respectively, such that, for all y ∈ B, F (·, y) :
A→ Rn is locally one-to-one.
Lemma 9 Fix ξ > 0, f , ′. Then there exists ∗ such that for  > ∗ , ν(ξ−, f +, 0) <
ν(ξ, f +, χ).
Proof. When  = 1, ν(ξ−, f +, 0) = ν(0, f +, 1) < ν(ξ−( χ), f +, 1) ≤
ν(ξ−( χ), f+, χ). The first equality follows because when  = 1, observing a
near miss makes a Bayesian player believe that ω = b with probability 1. Since she
will not update her belief about ω further, she is essentially a fully biased player
with ξ = 0. The first inequality follows because w(ξ, f , 1, c) is strictly increas-
ing in ξ. The second inequality follows from Lemma 8. Therefore when  = 1,
ν(ξ−, f +, 0) − ν(ξ, f +, χ) < 0.
Now I show that ν(ξ−, f +, 0) − ν(ξ, f +, χ) is continuous in  . First note that
given ξ, ′ and f , W : (c,  ) → R is a continuous mapping. Moreover, for any
 , W (ξ−, f +, 0, c) is strictly decreasing in c, so it is one-to-one. Also for each
 , c = ν(ξ−, f +, 0) solves W (ξ−, f +, 0, c) = 0. By Theorem Kumagai (1980),
ν(ξ−, f +, 0) is continuous in  . Similarly, ν(ξ, f +, χ) is continuous in  . Therefore
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ν(ξ−, f +, 0)−ν(ξ, f +, 1) is continuous in  . , ν(ξ−, f +, 0)−ν(ξ, f +, χ) is continuous
in  . Therefore there is ∗ such that ν(ξ−, f +, 0) − ν(ξ, f +, χ) < 0 for  > ∗.
Proof of Proposition 11. From Proposition 10, ν(ξ, f , 0) ≥ ν(ξ, f , χ). From
Lemma 9, there exists ∗ such that for  > ∗ , ν(ξ−, f +, 0) < ν(ξ, f +, χ). Therefore
there exists ∗ such that for  > ∗, N (ξ, f , 0) < N (ξ, f , χ).
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. The proof contains 3 steps. 1) N (ξ, f , 1) > 0. 2) For each ξ, f , ν(ξ, f , χ) is
continuous in χ. 3) For each ξ, f , ν(ξ−( χ), f , χ) is continuous in χ.
Step 1 N (ξ, f , 1) > 0.
Since ξ−(1) = ξ, it suffices to show that that ν(ξ−(1), f +, 1) = ν(ξ, f +, 1) >
ν(ξ, f , 1). First, I prove by induction that W t (ξ, f +, 1, c) > W t (ξ, f , 1, c) >
W t (ξ, f −, 1, c) for all t. Since
g(ξ)µ f + − c > g(ξ)µ f − c > g(ξ)µ f − − c,
we have
W1(ξ, f +, 1, c) > W1(ξ, f , 1, c) > W1(ξ, f −, 1, c).
Now suppose thatW t (ξ, f +, 1, c) > W t (ξ, f , 1, c) > W t (ξ, f −, 1, c).
W t+1(ξ, f +, 1, c) = g(ξ)µ f + − c+ δ
[
µ f +V t (ξ, f ++, 1, c)+ (1− µ f + )V t (ξ, f +−, 1, c)
]
> g(ξ)µ f − c + δ
[
µ f +V t (ξ, f +, 1, c) + (1 − µ f + )V t (ξ, f −, 1, c)
]
≥ g(ξ)µ f − c + δ
[
µ fV t (ξ, f +, 1, c) + (1 − µ f )V t (ξ, f −, 1, c)
]
= W t+1(ξ, f , 1, c).
To understand the first inequality, note that µ f + > µ f so g(ξ)µ f + − c > g(ξ)µ f −
c. Moreover, W t (ξ, f ++, 1, c) > W t (ξ, f +, 1, c) by the induction hypothesis. So
V t (ξ, f ++, 1, c) ≥ V t (ξ, f +, 1, c). Lastly, since f +− = f −+, W t (ξ, f +−, 1, c) =
W t (ξ, f −+, 1, c) > W t (ξ, f −, 1, c) by the induction hypothesis, which implies that
V t (ξ, f +−, 1, c) ≥ V t (ξ, f −, 1, c). The second inequality follows from the fact that
V t (ξ, f +, 1, c) > V t (ξ, f −, 1, c) and that µ f + > µ f .
This concludes the induction procedure for showing that W t (ξ, f +, 1, c) >
W t (ξ, f , 1, c). W t (ξ, f , 1, c) > W t (ξ, f −, 1, c) can be shown similarly. Therefore,
limt→∞W t (ξ, f +, 1, c) > limt→∞W t (ξ, f , 1, c) > limt→∞W t (ξ, f −, 1, c), so we have
W (ξ, f +, 1, c) ≥ W (ξ, f , 1, c) ≥ W (ξ, f −, 1, c)
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and
V (ξ, f +, 1, c) ≥ V (ξ, f , 1, c) ≥ V (ξ, f −, 1, c).
Now,
W (ξ, f +, 1, c) = g(ξ)µ f + − c + δ
[
µ f +V (ξ, f ++, 1, c) + (1 − µ f + )V (ξ, f +−, 1, c)
]
> g(ξ)µ f − c + δ
[
µ fV (ξ, f +, 1, c) + (1 − µ f )V (ξ, f −, 1, c)
]
= W (ξ, f , 1, c).
The inequality comes from the following facts: µ f + > µ f ; V (ξ, f ++, 1, c) ≥
V (ξ, f +, 1, c), V (ξ, f +−, 1, c) ≥ V (ξ, f −, 1, c). Therefore
ν(ξ, f +, 1) > ν(ξ, f , 1)
and N (ξ, f , 1) > 0.
Step 2 ν(ξ, f , χ) is continuous in χ.
Since ν(ξ, f , χ) is the solution toW (ξ, f , χ, c) = 0, from Theorem 2, we need only
to verify:
1. W (ξ, f , χ, c) is continuous in ( χ, c).
2. W (ξ, f , χ, c) is one-to-one in c.
1 is shown in the proof for Proposition 9. 2 follows from the fact thatW (ξ, f , χ, c)
is strictly decreasing in c.
Step 3 ν(ξ−( χ), f , χ) is continuous in χ.
Since ξ−( χ) is continuous in χ, we need to show that ν(ξ, f , χ) is continuous in
(ξ, χ). Similar to last step, we need to verify that:
1. W (ξ, f , χ, c) is continuous in (ξ, χ, c).
2. W (ξ, f , χ, c) one-to-one in c.
Both hold for the same reasons as in the last step.
From Step 2 and 3, N (ξ, f , χ) = ν(ξ−( χ), f , χ) − ν(ξ, f , χ) is continuous in χ.
Since N (ξ, f , 1) > 0, we have that there exists a neighborhood C of χ = 1 such that
for all χ ∈ C, N (ξ, f , χ) > 0. This establishes the result.
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C h a p t e r 3
MATCHING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
3.1 Introduction
Consider a two-sided matching game in which agents only know their own prefer-
ences with certainty and have a common prior over the possible preference profiles.
Can you design amechanismwith an equilibrium that is always stable with respect to
the true preferences for any realization of the preference profiles? The answer is no.
Roth (1989) demonstrates this by way of an example. For a particular distribution of
preference profiles, no mechanism has an equilibrium which is stable at all realized
states. The argument is, if such a mechanism exists, then there is a corresponding
stable direct revelation mechanism with a truth-telling equilibrium. However, given
that everyone else is reporting truthfully, some agent has a profitable deviation by
lying about her preference.
In the proof, the agent deviates to report a preference that is realized with zero
probability ex ante. Implicitly, this approach assumes that the mechanism designer
does not know the prior distribution of agents’ preferences or their support. In this
paper, I show that even if the mechanism designer does learn the common prior
and only allows agents to report preferences realized with positive probabilities,
profitable deviations still exist. That is, the incentive compatibility constraint is in
fact harsher than what is previously discovered.
After confirming the result from Roth (1989) under a stricter requirement for the
deviations allowed, I go on to illustrate another aspect of the incentive compatibility
constraints. Not only is the matching outcome inevitably unstable sometimes, it is
“truly unstable” in the sense that the blocking agents realize their ability to block
after observing the matching outcome. Using the same example used in the proof,
I show that any mechanism sometimes produces a truly unstable match. Lastly, I
discuss the potential to reach a stable matching with blocking pairs alone, free from
equilibrium forces.
3.2 The Model
The market is composed of a group of men and women. Each agent has a preference
ordering over the agents from the other group as well as the prospect of being
81
single. Each agent only knows his or her own preference and has a common prior
distribution of the preference profiles. In a general matching game, each agent has
a set of actions available irrespective of his or her own preference. According to
the rule of the game, an action profile leads to a matching outcome. Agents derive
utility from their matched partners.
Formally, a general two-sided matching game with incomplete information about
preferences is denoted by
Γ =
(
N = M ∪W, {Di}i∈N, g,U = Πi∈NUi, F) .
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,m|M |} is a finite set of men and W = {w1,w2, . . . ,w|W |} is a
finite set of women with |M |≥ 2 and |W |≥ 2. Di is the set of actions available
for Agent i ∈ N after each possible history in this general matching game. For
each i ∈ M , Ui = {ui : W ∪ {i} → R} is the set of all utility functions defined
over the possible matches for i and the prospect of remaining single, similarly for
each i ∈ W . I assume that agents have utility functions of the following form: the
least preferred partner (including staying single, for which the agent’s partner is
him/herself) is assigned utility 0. The second least preferred partner is assigned
utility 1, the third least preferred assigned 2, etc. M denotes the set of all matchings
between M andW . Given u ∈ U , let S(u) be the set of stable matchings with respect
to u. g : Πi∈NDi → ∆(M) maps an action profile to a lottery over matchings. A
pure strategy for Agent i is a function σi : Ui → Di. F is a discrete probability
distribution overU , where F (u) is the probability assigned to u ∈ U. F has support
U. [U, F] is called the state of information of the game Γ. [(Di)i∈N, g] is called a
mechanism. Γ is common knowledge. In addition, Agent i learns ui prior to the
play.
A revelation game ΓR is a game in which the mechanism is of the form (U, φ), where
φ : U → ∆(M) maps stated preferences into lotteries over matchings. Therefore
in a revelation game each agent reports a preference. Given any equilibrium σ∗ of
Γ, let ΓR(σ∗) be the corresponding revelation game such that φ(u) = g(σ∗(u)) for
each u ∈ U. By the revelation principle, truth telling is an equilibrium in ΓR(σ∗)
and when all agents tell the truth in ΓR(σ∗), the resulting matching is the same as
that when the agents play σ∗ in Γ.
Theorem 3 (Roth, 1989) If there are at least two agents on each side of the market,
then for any general mechanism [{Di}i∈N, g] there exist states of information [U, F]
forwhich every equilibriumσ of the resulting game Γ has the property that g(σ(u)) <
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∆(S(u)) for some u ∈ U . (And the set of such u with g(σ(u)) < ∆(S(u)) has positive
probability under F.) That is, there exists no mechanism with the property that at
least one of its equilibria is always stable with respect to the true preferences at
every realization of a game.
Theorem 3 is proved by giving a state of information [U, F] that causes every
stable revelation mechanism (and hence every mechanism) to fail. The state of
information is shown in Table 1. M = {m1,m2} andW = {w1,w2}. m2 and w2 have
constant preference across all states. For each state ω ∈ Ω ≡ {a, b, c, d}, u(ω) is the
corresponding u ∈ U. Pr(ω) is the probability that u(ω) is realized. The case with
larger sets of agents follows from the fact that the four agents who play a role in the
proof can be embedded in any larger set of agents without affecting the conclusion,
as long as they do not consider any additional agents to be acceptable matches.
When ω = c, without loss of generality assume the matching (m1,w1), (m2,w2) is
given probability higher than 12 . The proof shows that no truth-telling equilibria
exists. The argument is as follows. If q is sufficiently small, in which case c
becomes the most probable, then w2 can report her preference to be m1 and ensure
the matching (m1,w2), (m2,w1) be carried out. Therefore given that everyone else
is reporting truthfully, w2 has an incentive to deviate.
However, w2 has deviated to report a preference that is realized with probability
0 according to the common prior. The proof therefore implicitly assumes that the
mechanism designer does not know the support of agents’ preferences. In the next
section, I show that if the prior distribution is indeed known to the mechanism
designer, still no truth-telling equilibrium exists.
Table 3.1: State of information
State ω Probability Pr(ω) Preference u(ω) Stable matching S(u(ω))
m1 : w1 w1 : m2 m2
a q2
m2 : w2,w1 w2 : m1,m2 w2
m1 : w1,w2 w1 : m2 m1 m2b q(1 − q)
m2 : w2,w1 w2 : m1,m2 w2 w1
m1 : w1,w2 w1 : m2,m1 m1 m2 m1 m2
c (1 − q)2
m2 : w2,w1 w2 : m1,m2 w2 w1 w1 w2
m1 : w1 w1 : m2,m1 m1 m2d q(1 − q)
m2 : w2,w1 w2 : m1,m2 w1 w2
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3.3 The Result
Consider a revelation game ΓR = (N = M ∪W,U, F, φ) in which φ(u) ∈ ∆(S(u))
for any u; that is, the mechanism is stable with respect to the reported preferences.
A pure strategy for Agent i is σi : Ui → Ui. I focus on pure strategy equilibria
throughout the paper. Let u−i = Π j,iu j . For a matching µ and Agent i, µ(i) denotes
Agent i’s matching partner. F (u−i | ui) denotes Agent i’s posterior probability
assigned to u = (ui, u−i) given that i’s preference is ui. The equilibrium is defined
as follows.
Definition 5 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈N of the game ΓR =
(N,U, f , φ) is as follows: ∀i, ∀ui ∈ Ui, ∀u′i ∈ Ui,∑
u−i
F (u−i |ui) ·
∑
µ∈M
φ
(
σ∗−i (u−i), σ
∗
i (ui)
)
(µ) · ui (µ(i)) ≥
∑
u−i
F (u−i |ui) ·
∑
µ∈M
φ
(
σ∗−i (u−i), u
′
i
)
(µ) · ui (µ(i)).
Given an equilibrium σ∗ and Agent j’s equilibrium action u∗j , let σ
∗−1
j (u
∗
j ) = {u˜ j ∈
Uj | σ∗j (u˜ j ) = u∗j }. Agent i’s posterior probability assigned to Agent j’s preference
being u j , given that Agent i’s preference is
Πi (u j | ui, σ∗, u∗j ) =

∑
{u˜:u˜ j=u j,u˜i=ui } F (u˜)∑
{u˜:u˜ j∈σ∗−1j (u∗j ),u˜i=ui } F (u˜)
if u j ∈ σ∗−1j (u∗j )
and
∑
{u˜:u˜ j∈σ∗−1j (u∗j ),u˜i=ui } F (u˜) , 0,
0 otherwise.
Next, I define an instability notion for a revelation gamewith incomplete information.
Apart from requiring that a blocking pair exists, I require at least one of the agents
in the blocking pair realizes their ability to block at some preference realization.
Definition 6 A matching µ is truly unstable if the following two conditions hold:
1. µ is unstable. That is, there exists (i, j) where i ∈ M , j ∈ W such that
ui ( j) > u(µ(i)) and u j (i) > u(µ( j)). Such (i, j) is called a blocking pair.
Denote the set of blocking pairs given a matching µ by B(µ).
2. There exists a blocking pair of which at least one agent realizes his or her
ability to block after observing the equilibrium actions at some realization u.
That is, there exists (i, j) ∈ B(µ) and u ∈ U such that either
∀u j s.t. Πi (u j |ui, σ∗, u∗j ) > 0, u j (i) > u j (µ( j)),
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or
∀ui s.t. Π j (ui |u j, σ∗, u∗i ) > 0, ui ( j) > ui (µ(i)).
The first condition is the usual stability notion when there is complete information
over agents’ preferences. The second condition is new. It states that for some
blocking pair, at least one of the blocking agents, say Agent i ∈ M , realizes his
ability to block. In particular, given the other blocking Agent j ∈ W ’s message and
the equilibrium strategies, for every preference of Agent j, she strictly prefers Agent
i to her current matching partner. Agent i then realizes his ability to block.
Now I introduce the main result:
Theorem 4 If there are at least two agents on each side of the market, then for any
general mechanism [{Di}i∈N, g] there exist states of information [U, F] for which
every equilibriumσ of the resulting game Γ has the property that for some u ∈ U and
µ truly unstable, g(σ(u))(µ) > 0. (And the set of such u with g(σ(u)) < ∆(S(u))
has positive probability under F.) That is, for any mechanism, at least one of its
equilibria is truly unstable with respect to the true preferences at some realization
of the game.
Proof. Let φ be any stable revelation matching mechanism. Consider the state of
information in Table 1 from Roth (1989). Since agents can only observe their own
preferences, the information partition of each agent is as follows:
P(m1) = {{a, d}, {b, c}},
P(w1) = {{a, b}, {c, d}},
P(m2) = {a, b, c, d},
P(w2) = {a, b, c, d}.
By reporting preferences, agents report the information partition element that they
find themselves in. Since the mechanism designer knows that m2 and w2 cannot
distinguish any states, there is no need for them to report anything. Therefore only
m1 and w1 are the active agents. When ω = c, let the matching ((m1,w1), (m2,w2))
be realized with probability s.
I say that an agent “reveals” if the agent truthfully reports his or her own preference,
i.e., the element of partition this agent observes, and “lies” if the agent does not
truthfully report his or her own preference, i.e., the element of partition this agent
does not observe. For example, when state a is realized, m1 will be lying if he
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reports {b, c}, and revealing if he reports {a, d}. m1 and w1’s payoffs in each state
given their actions and are summarized in Table 3.2 - 3.5:
w1 lies w1 reveals
m1 lies 2s, 2s 0, 2
m1 reveals 2, 0 1, 1
Table 3.2: ω = a
w1 lies w1 reveals
m1 lies 2, 0 0, 1
m1 reveals 1 + s, 2s 1, 2
Table 3.3: ω = b
w1 lies w1 reveals
m1 lies 0, 0 2, 1
m1 reveals 1, 2 1 + s, 2 + s
Table 3.4: ω = c
w1 lies w1 reveals
m1 lies 0, 2 2s, 1 + s
m1 reveals 1, 0 2, 1
Table 3.5: ω = d
From Table 3.2 and 3.5, ifm1 is in the partition set {a, d}, he will reveal regardless of
w1’s report. Similarly, from Table 3.2 and 3.3 if w1 is in the partition set {a, b}, she
will reveal regardless ofm1’s report. Therefore the key in characterizing equilibrium
is to pin down m1’s report at partition {b, c} and w1’s report at partition {c, d}.
Simple calculations show that there are three equilibria:
1. If
1 − 2q
1 − q ≤ s ≤
q
1 − q , both m1 and w1 always reveal.
2. If s ≤ 1 − 2q
1 − q , m1 always reports {a, d} and w1 always reveals.
3. If s ≥ q
1 − q , w1 always reports {a, b} and m1 always reveals.
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In order for
1 − 2q
1 − q ≤ s ≤
q
1 − q , we need q ≥
1
3 . Therefore as long as q <
1
3 ,
in every equilibrium someone lies. This implies that under the current state of
information, truth-telling can never be equilibrium in any game induced by a stable
revelation mechanism. Therefore any equilibrium in the original matching game
cannot be always stable. This proves Roth’s theorem. Now we need to find for each
equilibrium the state that makes the matching truly unstable.
Equilibrium 2 When ω = b, since m1 reports {a, d} and w1 reports {a, b}, the
matching outcome will be S(u(a)) where m1 is single. Therefore m1, who prefers
w2 than being single and knows w2 prefer himself to m2 in all states, will realize he
can form a blocking pair with w2.
Equilibrium 3 When ω = d, since w1 reports {a, b} and m1 reports {a, d}, the
matching outcome will be S(u(a)) where w1 is single. Therefore w1, who prefers
m1 than being single and knows m1 prefer herself to being single in all states, will
realize she can form a blocking pair with m1.
3.4 Discussion
An alternative way to fix Roth (1989)’s proof is by starting with an alternative state
of information: with probability  , the preference profile is as those in Table 1;
with probability 1 −  , the profile is uniformly drawn from the set of all possible
combinations of all agents’ possible preferences. As long as  is small enough,
state ω = c is realized with high enough probability such that for w2 can profitably
deviate to report m1.
It is easy to check that when Equilibrium 1 is played, only when ω = b is the
outcome unstable with respect to true preference. In this case, if m1 and w2 form a
blocking pair which is publicly observed, w1 will realize that m1 was lying and that
ω ∈ {a, b} ∩ {b, c} = b and form a blocking pair with m2, thus reaching the stable
matching outcome. Similarly for Equilibrium 2. Therefore, information released
through blocking pair formation can lead to more blocking pairs forming, leading
the matching outcome to stability. This implies that blocking pairs may be able to
serve an informational role and lead to stability, without the help of equilibrium.
To illustrate, suppose that m1 does not know w1’s strategy and w1 does not know
m1’s strategy. That is, no equilibrium condition is assumed. However, I assume that
agents do not play dominated strategies. Recall that this means whenω ∈ {a, d}, m1
reveals and reports {a, d}; when ω ∈ {a, b}, w1 reveals and reports {a, b}. There are
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three possible outcomes: (m2,w2), ((m1,w2), (m2,w1)) and ((m1,w1), (m2,w2)).
First note that when thematching outcome is ((m1,w2), (m2,w1)), which is the stable
matching when ω ∈ {b, c}, m1 must have reported {b, c}. Since {b, c} is dominated
when ω ∈ {a, d}, this implies that ω ∈ {b, c}. However, m1 does not know whether
ω = b or ω = c whereas w1 knows this. Either way, the matching outcome is stable
with respect to true preferences and no agent can form a blocking pair. A symmetric
argument applies when the matching outcome is ((m1,w1), (m2,w2)).
Now suppose that the matching outcome is (m2,w2), which is the stable matching
when ω = a. Therefore m1 must have reported {a, d} and w1 must have reported
{a, b}. Without the knowledge that agents are playing according to an equilibrium,
ω ∈ {a, b, c, d}. Next I show that for each ω, the outcome after blocking pair
formation is stable. Moreover, m1 can manipulate such that the outcome is men-
optimal in every state.
Suppose ω = a. Given m1’s information partition, he learns that ω ∈ {a, d}. If
ω = a, then w1 truly finds m1 unacceptable and m1 cannot form a blocking pair
with her. If ω = d, then m1 expects w1 to form a blocking pair with him. This is
because w1 cannot form a blocking pair with her preferred partner m2 since he is
already matched with his favorite partner. Either way, m1 does not need to initiate a
blocking pair. On the other hand, w1 will not block either since her only acceptable
partner is matched with his favorite partner. In this case, the matching outcome
is “truly stable” in the sense that agents will not form blocking pairs, even given
the information released through matching outcome and the lack of formation of
blocking pairs.
Suppose ω = b. Given m1’s information partition, he learns that ω ∈ {b, c}. In
either case, he will be better off matched with either women. When ω = b, he can
only form a blocking pair with w2 because w1 finds him unacceptable. If ω = c, he
can form a blocking pair with either w1 or w2. On the other hand, if ω = c, w1 will
form a blocking pair with m1. Therefore m1 does not need to initiate a blocking pair
with w1 and will block with w2 instead. However, when ω = b, w1 will not form a
blocking pair because he finds m1 unacceptable and m2 is already matched with his
favorite partner. Therefore m1 forms a blocking pair with w2, after which w1 may
form a blocking pair with m2, leading to the outcome ((m1,w2), (m2,w1)), which is
stable with respect to the true preference.
Suppose ω = c. Given m1’s information partition, he learns that ω ∈ {b, c}. From
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the last paragraph, m1 forms a blocking pair with w2. However, w1 learns that
ω ∈ {c, d} and will indeed form a blocking pair with m1, leading to the outcome
((m1,w1), (m2,w2)), stable with respect to the true preference.
Suppose ω = d. Again, w1 forms a blocking pair with m1, leading to the stable
match ((m1,w1), (m2,w2)).
Therefore, given that (m2,w2) is the matching outcome, at each ω, blocking pairs
lead to a match stable with respect to the true preference. For other outcomes, no
blocking pairs are formed and the outcome is stable with respect to true preferences.
Therefore, allowing blocking pairs leads to a stable outcome under all circumstances.
When ω ∈ {a, b, d}, there is only one stable match available. When ω = c, however,
there are two stable matches. Therefore the only possibility for manipulating to get
a more preferred stable match lies in when ω = c. Now I show that m1 can get
the men-optimal matching at ω = c. From the argument before, if the matching
outcome is (m2,w2) whenω = c, the eventual match after blocking pairs are formed
is the men-optimal matching ((m1,w1), (m2,w2)). If the matching outcome is
((m1,w1), (m2,w2)) or ((m1,w2), (m2,w1)), the outcome is finalized. Therefore in
order to avoid the women-optimal matching ((m1,w2), (m2,w1)), m1 should report
{a, d} when he learns thatω ∈ {b, c}. This way, the outcome is men-optimal at every
state.
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